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ABSTRACT 
 
Two Rival Versions of Historical Inquiry 
 and Their Application to the Study of the Sixteenth Amendment. (May 2006) 
James R. L. Noland, B.A., University of Virginia; 
M.A., Texas A&M University; 
M.P.S.A., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. John J. McDermott 
 
 
In this dissertation I identify the philosophy of Giambattista Vico and Karl Marx 
as representing, broadly, two rival versions of historical inquiry. Put simply, these rival 
versions endorse either reasons or causes, respectively, as the proper objects of study for 
historians. After introducing the study of the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution as an example of the type of historical event towards which these 
versions of inquiry might by directed, I then outline the arguments Vico and Marx give 
for these rival versions. Paying special attention to the assumptions about human nature, 
reason, and freedom at work in these arguments, I propose that comparing the 
plausibility and feasibility of these assumptions might allow a means of adjudicating 
between these comprehensive and mutually incompatible methods of historical study. I 
proceed to draw on the work of John Rawls and Alasdair MacIntyre, among others, to 
show that Marx’s conceptions of human nature, reason, and freedom are ultimately 
flawed and therefore untenable. I conclude by arguing that Vico’s version of historical 
inquiry relies on an understanding of these concepts that is more plausible than Marx’s 
and withstands the objections to which Marx’s understanding succumbs. Finally, I return 
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my focus to the study of the Sixteenth Amendment and consider how Vico’s version of 
historical inquiry might inform this project. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation I discuss and explain what I have identified as two rival 
versions of historical inquiry.  I then suggest a means for adjudicating between the two. 
The ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution serves as an 
example of an important historical event towards which we might direct these rival 
versions of inquiry. 
My hope for this project is that it will provide some insight into the factors that 
led to political events such as the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment and that these 
insights might not only help us to understand the past but also improve our ability to 
shape the present and future. Thus, my interest in the study of history is practical; it is 
motivated by the conviction that it is possible to apply lessons we find in the study of 
history to our current endeavors.  
I have decided to focus my attention on two particular accounts of the method and 
object of historical inquiry, those of Giambattista Vico and Karl Marx, because I take 
them to be broadly representative of the two most basic alternative approaches to 
studying human history. Put very simply, the first of these approaches seeks to find the 
reasons for human behavior; the second seeks to find the causes. 
Each approach entails views about human nature, reason, language, and freedom. 
Therefore, in my attempt to adjudicate between these two approaches, I will direct much 
of my attention to the coherence and internal consistency of these underlying views.
                                                 
  This dissertation follows the style of MLA Style Manual. 
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I begin by offering a summary of the story of the development of interest in, and 
support for, a national income tax that began shortly after the War of 1812 and 
culminated nearly a century later with the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, 
which gave the federal government the power to tax income. I chose this particular story 
for several reasons. First, the ratification of this amendment was clearly of great import 
for our country. Any change to our Constitution, by definition, changes our identity as a 
nation, but beyond this fact, this particular change increased the power of the federal 
government, and ultimately made possible such major policy initiatives such as the New 
Deal and the Great Society.  
The story is also interesting to study because of the length of time it took for the 
idea of the tax to become reality; during the one hundred or so years from beginning to 
end the idea’s popularity waxed and waned and drew the support and opposition of a 
variety of factions and interests. The story involves economic, ethical, and political 
subplots and so many groups and individuals along the way that hope for a perfect 
explanation is surely in vain. Yet its significance calls for an honest attempt to 
understand as completely as possible why the federal income tax was ultimately 
approved and how its enactment affected the populace, for better or worse.  
After relaying this story, and discussing competing theories about why the 
amendment was ratified, it should be apparent to the reader what is at stake in the 
attempt to adjudicate between the two rival versions of historical inquiry. The version 
one adopts will determine the type of knowledge one seeks, the way one identifies 
factors as significant, and the methods of observation and data collection one uses. 
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Having established the impetus for my project, I set aside the discussion of the Sixteenth 
Amendment with a promise to revisit it in the last chapter where I will offer some 
suggestions for how to proceed with its study.  
Next, I begin my presentation of Vico’s philosophy of history as found in his 
New Science. Though Vico’s style is somewhat peculiar, his explanation of the object 
and method of historical inquiry is fascinating and instructive. He contends that human 
history is much more accessible to us than is natural history or the workings of the 
physical world because human history is made by humans and can therefore be 
understood in a way these other fields cannot. His original contribution is to name and 
expound upon a previously unidentified, though not unused, faculty of the intellect. He 
calls this faculty “fantasia,” or “imagination” and the knowledge it aspires to is 
understanding, specifically the sympathetic understanding of “what it must have been 
like” to live, think and act as did particular persons in the past. To attain this 
understanding we need to understand the language and interests of the people we are 
studying. The “master key” that allows us to see the world as others did is the fact that 
all humans have in common their participation in the three fundamental institutions of 
religion, marriage, and burial.  The fact that we share these institutions, so Vico argues, 
means that our interests and orientations are similar enough to those of other people that 
we are able to imagine ourselves in their places and in so doing come to understand their 
motives and reasons for acting.  
Karl Marx also contends that we can know history because history has been 
made by us, but his justification for why this is so is radically different from Vico’s. 
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Marx holds that we can come to understand the mechanisms that move history because 
we can discern how consciousness must have arisen and how society must have formed. 
We accomplish this by shedding all received wisdom, escaping from our given 
paradigms of consciousness, and pursuing a purely empirical science of history. This 
will enable us to grasp the ways in which human behavior is shaped and directed by 
material conditions and corresponding modes of production. 
Both Vico and Marx present compelling and persuasive arguments for the proper 
approach to studying history. Yet, these arguments are built on assumptions about the 
nature of reason and freedom that are incompatible. Attempting to incorporate both 
approaches into one large system in the hope that this might allow one to cast one’s nets 
wider and achieve a more complete understanding than either approach might offer 
alone would simply result in confusion and contradiction because each denies the truth 
of the other’s explanation. A choice must be made. This is more easily said than done 
because each of these philosophers proposes a comprehensive system of inquiry, neither 
can be judged according to the standards of the other and there is no third standard 
against which both could be measured. Appealing to historical accuracy is not helpful 
because the disagreement between the two concerns the descriptions and explanations of 
the same events.  
The only way to adjudicate between these two rival versions of historical inquiry 
is to examine their internal consistency and coherence. To do this I first try to identify 
and describe the accounts of reason and freedom that the two philosophers employ in 
their own inquiry and which they assume to obtain in those persons they purport to 
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study. I then look to philosophers such as John Rawls and Alasdair MacIntyre, among 
others, to illustrate and critique the accounts of reason and freedom found in the work of 
Vico and Marx. My eventual conclusion is that there are some fatal flaws in Marx’s 
understanding of reason and freedom that call into question the wisdom of accepting his 
approach. In contrast, we find in Vico’s philosophy a more attractive and coherent 
explanation of these concepts and in my final chapter I endorse the acceptance of Vico’s 
version of historical inquiry, or at least something very much like it. I then offer an 
example of an historical study consistent with Vico’s prescriptions and suggest some 
possible implications of this particular study for understanding the ratification of the 
Sixteenth Amendment.  
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                                              CHAPTER II 
         THE HISTORY OF THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was passed by Congress on 
July 2, 1909; three years and seven months later, on the morning of February 3, 1913, 
Delaware became the 36  state to approve its ratification thereby making it the law of 
the land.
th
1 This amendment, which gave the federal government the power to tax income, 
was the culmination of almost fifty years of debate about the desirability and legality of 
such taxation. 
A national income tax was first proposed in the United States in 1815 by the 
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Dallas.2  His proposal was in response to the rising 
debt caused by the War of 1812.  Nothing ever came of this proposal and it was another 
fifty years before the issue was raised once more.  This time debt brought on by war was 
the impetus again.  In 1862 the Union enacted the first national income tax.3  Though the 
tax was repealed in 1872, seven years after the end of the War Between the States, 
almost every congressional session for the next twenty years saw proposals to reinstate 
some form of national income tax.  Finally, in 1894, the passage of the Wilson-Gorman 
Tariff brought about a 2% tax on income over $4,000.4   
This tax was short lived, however. Charles Pollock of Massachusetts filed suit in 
response to a notice from Farmer’s Loan and Trust Co. (with whom he was a 
stockholder) stating that they would be withholding 2% of any income earned over the 
amount of $4000 and delivering this money to the Department of the Treasury in 
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compliance with the requirements of the Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894. Pollock 
contended that this tax was unconstitutional insofar as it was a direct tax.  
Direct taxation by the federal government had been expressly prohibited by 
Article 1, Section 9 of the U.S Constitution.5 Although the Constitution does not 
explicitly define what it means to be a “direct” tax, the precedent set in a 1796 Supreme 
Court decision established that direct taxes were taxes on property; presumably, indirect 
taxes are taxes on transactions, such as sales taxes.6 Though the two sides disputed the 
description of the income tax as direct, ultimately the court determined that the 
description was accurate and the law was found unconstitutional.7
The Court’s ruling in the Pollock case led proponents of a national income tax to 
conclude that for them ever to be successful in instituting such a tax, the Constitution 
would have to be changed.  In 1909, the year the amendment was passed through 
Congress, there were 46 states. For ratification an amendment needs the approval of 
three-fourths of the states.  This meant that thirty-five states would be needed.  Before 
enough states had voted in favor of the amendment two more states were added to the 
Union. In 1912 Arizona and New Mexico became states thereby raising the number 
needed for ratification to thirty-six. Ultimately forty-two of the then forty-eight states 
would vote for ratification. 
The first time a national income tax was proposed was in response to the debt 
accrued during the War of 1812; the first time a national income tax was enacted was in 
response to the debt accruing during the War Between the States.  However, the final 
push for, and passage of, the Sixteenth Amendment and a new national income tax was 
 
 8
not in response to any war.  There were significant economic factors, but none as urgent 
or drastic as war.   
In the year 1800 public expenditures were just 3% of the national income; by 
1900 they had increased to 10%.8  These years saw the national expansion westward, the 
industrial revolution, growth of cities, and, following the War, the freeing of slaves and 
the subsequent changes in the Southern economy. The agrarian South, already at odds 
with the industrial and urban North before the War was even more so following its 
defeat. 
In the final years of the 19th Century federal spending increased from $4.84 per 
capita in 1889 to $7.01 per capita in 1913 during which time the population increased by 
85%.  A depression in the early 1890s helped contribute to a deficit of $74 million in 
1894. 9 During this time the primary source of income for the federal government were 
tariffs and excise taxes, both of which raised prices for consumers while enriching 
businessmen and merchants.10  These tariffs and taxes increased the prices of basic 
necessities to such an extent it was estimated the average poor family would spend up to 
80% of its savings on taxes compared to just 8 to 10 % of earnings for the wealthy.11  
As prices increased, wages did not.12 From 1895 to 1910, the richest 1.6% of 
families in the United States increased their share of the national wealth from 10.8% to 
19%.13  The same tariffs that burdened the poor resulted in even greater wealth for the 
rich.  At the same time as the divide between rich and poor grew, wealth became 
increasingly concentrated in the North. In the first decade of the 20th Century eighty-five 
percent of those who earned over $100,000 a year lived in the Northeast.14
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Reflecting on these conditions and trends one might expect the public to respond 
with some measure either to draw on this wealth to support the government or to 
redistribute it. It is not hard to imagine why an income tax on the wealthy might be 
popular among the general population, as it in fact was.15 Yet popular support for such a 
measure does not necessarily translate into a change in policy.   
In 1908 Republicans had a 214-75 majority in the House of Representatives and 
a 60-32 majority in the Senate.16  Republicans were, generally speaking, supporters of 
the tariff system.  They were the party of business and industry, not the party of the 
workers or the poor. Furthermore, politicians in general and those in the Senate in 
particular tended to be wealthy themselves.  Life in Washington, DC was expensive, too 
expensive to be covered comfortably by a senator’s salary.  Thus, only those who were 
wealthy enough to maintain a home in DC independently of any government salary were 
capable of serving.17  For an income tax bill or amendment to pass through congress it 
would have to be supported by many whose interests would seem to be, at least prima 
facie, contrary to its passage or ratification. Yet even given these unfavorable conditions 
in the legislature, supporters of the amendment faced a still larger battle after it had 
passed Congress.   
Three-fourths of the states would have to approve the amendment for ratification.  
It was expected that the Southern states could be counted on to approve (although not all 
Southern states did approve, Virginia voted against the amendment on states’ rights 
grounds), but the Northeast, where much of the wealth was concentrated, was a different 
story. In addition, the amendment would be brought before the state legislatures, not the 
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general public; supporters feared that this made the amendment more susceptible to 
defeat by powerful special interests.18 State politics were in many cases still controlled 
by party machines. Gerrymandering was common; often legislatures did not accurately 
represent the interests of the public. The anti-tax lobby was wealthy and powerful and 
had support from prominent newspapers such as the New York Times.19
As it turns out, these concerns were well founded. A number of states, especially 
in the North, did vote against the amendment. However, an interesting, and in this case 
crucial, aspect of the ratification process is that there is no time limit and negative votes 
can be reversed. Alabama, the poorest state in the Union, voted to ratify almost 
immediately after the amendment passed Congress.20  Yet other states took more time 
and in several cases first voted against the amendment and later reversed their votes. 
New York was particularly conspicuous in doing so.21 Congressional elections in 1910 
and 1912, after the amendment had passed Congress resulted in legislatures more 
favorably disposed to the income tax. 
Any amendment to our Constitution, by definition, changes our national identity; 
that is, it changes what constitutes us as a nation.  The causes and implications of any 
amendment are therefore important topics for study.  The Sixteenth Amendment is 
particularly interesting for several reasons. As noted, it was the culmination of a process 
that took almost one hundred years from the first proposal to ratification.  The story 
involves regional rivalries such as that between the defeated South and the Northeast, 
class conflict (the New York Times considered the income tax to be a “plot of the poor 
against the rich”22), powerful personalities such as William Jennings Bryan and Teddy 
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Roosevelt, and arguments about the nature of justice and the role of government.  The 
institution of the tax, in conjunction with the reductions and removals of tariffs, was a 
blow to business and a boon to the working class. Having once been unconstitutional, 
the federal income tax is now an essential part of our national government and is used to 
gather revenue and influence behavior. 
Steven Weisman, from whose narrative history of the Sixteenth Amendment, The 
Great Tax Wars, I have drawn heavily, writes in his introduction “if there is one 
overarching theme to my approach, it probably comes from the incomparably wise and 
acerbic Progressive Era writer Ambrose Bierce and The Devil’s Dictionary he published 
in 1911.  Here is Bierce’s great definition of politics: A strife of interests masquerading 
as a contest of principles. The conduct of public affairs for private advantage.”  
Weisman identifies “the two basic conflicting principles in our argument over 
taxes.”  These principles are “justice” and “virtue.”  He explains that some would argue 
in favor of the tax on the basis of the justice of either income redistribution or payment 
by ability, or both.  Arguments against the tax often rely on the principle that it is a tax 
on virtue, that is, a tax or penalty on hard work and self-reliance.23 As he concludes his 
introduction Weisman is ambiguous as to whether he believes that appeals to these 
principles are always cover for private advantage or whether they are, or could be, 
genuine. At times he writes as if forces on either side of the issue were motivated solely 
by their financial interests.  At others he pays close attention to arguments and 
acknowledges, sometimes with puzzlement, that some of the players seem to be working 
against their own interests.   
 
 12
This ambiguity highlights a significant question: what is the proper focus of the 
enquiry into the explanation for historical changes such as the ratification of the 
Sixteenth Amendment? Should we examine the arguments and ideas in the debate 
leading to this change, or should we look to gather quantifiable data concerning 
economic and material conditions, working with the assumption that persons always act 
to further their economic and material interests? If a change to our constitution is a 
change in our national identity then the nature and causes of the change will inform our 
understanding of who we were and who we are. Conversely, our understanding of who 
we are will inform our inquiry into the causes of such a change. Though Weisman, 
among others, is ambiguous and at times seems to look at both options, behind these two 
alternatives are two rival conceptions of human nature and historical change. 
These two approaches, the first of which I will associate with Giambattista Vico 
and the second of which I will associate with Karl Marx, both begin with assumptions 
about the causes of human action and the nature of human reason.  The assumptions of 
these two methods are incompatible with one another. 
To choose to examine arguments and ideas necessitates identifying particular 
individuals and their roles as opposed to focusing on classes.  This method rests on the 
belief that neither is consciousness simply a manifestation of material conditions nor are 
ideas and arguments reducible to material interests.  Understanding the language and the 
stories that shape the individuals involved in the process of the historical change will be 
crucial for reaching an acceptable explanation.  Implicit in this approach is that we as 
historians are unable on our own to either recognize or define the significant factors that 
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brought about such an event as the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment.  In other 
words, though we might guess or anticipate those things that might have influenced the 
political actors involved in the process, we cannot presume to know a priori what events 
or conditions would have been relevant to their decisions nor how they would have 
interpreted these events and conditions. This method involves studying the customs, 
practices, and stories of a culture in order to understand the rationality of the culture.   
To assume that we as historians can discern the causes of change by examining 
economic and material conditions is to assume either that these conditions directly 
determine human behavior or that these conditions determine the language and 
consciousness of the populace, thereby indirectly determining behavior.  This latter 
approach allows, to some degree, that people act according to reasons, but assumes both 
that these reasons are always determined by, and according to, the consciousness shaped 
by these conditions and that all interests, no matter how they are expressed, are 
ultimately reducible to economic and material interests.  At the foundation of this mode 
of enquiry is a form of scientific realism regarding the identity and nature of events and 
conditions; that is, at bottom is the premise that there is a way that events and people 
“really are” that can be perceived and considered independently of their time or place. 
Although it is certainly true that arguments can and have been used 
disingenuously, as a “masquerade” for self-interest, it does not follow that arguments are 
always so used.  Furthermore, while it is possible that an individual might consider both 
personal financial interest and arguments about principle when considering a course of 
action, to acknowledge this is not to acknowledge a third, middle option. Explaining 
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why this is the case should help to illustrate the significance of the differences between 
the two approaches.  
If we suppose that persons make decisions freely, based on rational consideration 
of their interests, we need not exclude financial or material concerns from the list of 
possible interests one might consider.  In fact, we might find that persons we are 
studying are concerned only with finances, for example. At issue, however, is how to 
answer the question of how we can know what a person’s interests are and how this 
person understands them and acts on them. The difference in the two approaches does 
not amount simply to different conclusions about what motivates action.  The difference 
between the approaches has to do with assumptions about how we can know what 
motivates a particular action, how we identify a particular action as such, and how we 
identify actions, events, and conditions as significant units of observation.  
Discussing the debate over the income tax that took place during the campaign 
for the 1896 presidential election, Weisman says, “As always, the debate was about 
economics but the terms were moralistic.”  Both sides, he writes, “felt that they – more 
than their political adversaries- embodied the virtues of hard work and sacrifice that 
formed the foundation of American society.”24  Confronted with such an observation, 
the historian has a choice to make.  This choice is not simply between cynicism and 
naïve gullibility.  Rather, the choice is between rival conceptions of human nature and 
historical enquiry.  One such conception would lead the historian to examine the stories 
and practices that informed the people and politicians of the day in order to make sense 
of the terms of the debate. The other conception would lead the historian to discount or 
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dismiss the language of the debate as the expected manifestation of the false 
consciousness of the time, the result of the self-interest of the powerful. 
It is easy to find data to support either approach. As detailed above, the years 
leading up to the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment saw a growing disparity 
between rich and poor. As early as 1863, in the middle of the war, the Secretary of the 
Treasury was observed buying a $3000 shawl for his daughter; at the time one could pay 
a substitute $300 to take one’s spot in the Union Army.  Weisman reports that it was 
widely noted at the time that the Secretary had paid the equivalent of 10 men’s lives for 
this shawl.25  That one person, a national leader, could not only afford to, but would 
even consider paying the equivalent of 10 men’s lives for a luxury item is a clear sign of 
a great class division between the rulers and the ruled.  
As the turn of the century neared, the ranks of the millionaires grew; 
businessmen grew rich while the working class paid extra for basic goods to cover the 
cost of the tariffs that protected these businessmen. During the first decade of the 
twentieth century custom duties supplied 50% of the federal government’s revenue.26  
This was a paradigm case of exploitation; the circumstances were right for division and 
animosity between classes. Buenker notes that it is “hard to find another issue that so 
united the wealthy” as opposition to an income tax.  The fact that the vast majority of the 
population would pay no income tax makes it seem clear that it would have been in the 
financial interest of this majority to impose this tax on the wealthy few. 
Literature such as Andrew Carnegie’s essay “The Gospel of Wealth,” in which 
he advocated “honest poverty,27” newspapers’ condemnation of the tax as “class 
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legislation,28” and a war of the poor against the rich, along with such apparently devious 
arguments by politicians such as Bourke Cockran of New York all lend support to the 
notion that any arguments against the tax were just cover for the self-interested 
exploitation of the working class by the wealthy. Cockran claimed that the poor would 
be humiliated if the rich were the only one’s allowed to contribute to the funding of the 
government.29
Yet despite the ability of the wealthy to influence the policy makers through 
contributions, their ability to frame the terms of the debate through the media, which 
they controlled, and the fact that many of the policy makers were themselves wealthy, 
the income tax finally did become law. Eventually the wealthy passed a tax that only 
they would have to pay and they removed a tariff of which they were the sole 
beneficiaries.  Why and how did this happen? This is, perhaps, the biggest puzzle in the 
story of the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment.  It is here, in particular, that the 
differences between the two methods of inquiry become most striking and clear.  In 
attempting to account for this unprecedented political move, there is one critical point 
that should be kept in mind. Though it is easy and tempting, especially for those who 
come from the American tradition, to imagine the wealthy powerful of the period in 
question as constrained by the laws, customs, and Constitution, this temptation should be 
avoided. Historical inquiry should be as concerned to recognize and explain what did not 
happen just as much as what did happen. I will return to this point for exposition later. 
Looking back at the conditions and trends of the late 19th and early 20th century 
one might have predicted an uprising or a clash of some sort between the working poor 
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and the elite rich.  In fact, William Jennings Bryan, in a letter to his wife, predicted 
eventual conflict between the farmers and workers and the wealthy who benefited from 
their work.30  In the 1890’s there were strikes and uprisings; a depression in 1893 led to 
20% unemployment adding fuel to the growing fire.31 A move by Senator Aldrich of 
Rhode Island to increase and expand the tariffs when others were hoping to lower the 
tariffs and quiet the call for an income tax might be seen as highlighting the exploitation 
and alienation of the working class.32  However, there never were any widespread or 
large scale revolts.  There were no threats to overthrow the government.   
There is evidence that some saw an income tax as a way to placate the poor.  
Weisman quotes Uriel Hall, congressman from Missouri, describing the tax as “a 
measure to kill anarchy and keep down socialists.”33  Similarly, Representative Joseph 
Bailey of Texas saw the tax as in the interests of the rich as it “would do more to silence 
the envious voice of anarchy than all the benefactions and the charities which they can 
do.”34
However, more prominent and common than appeals to the self-interest of the 
rich in placating the poor were arguments about the injustice of the tariff system and the 
fairness of an income tax. 
There were several general forms of argument offered in favor of an income tax. 
Some of these arguments were simply financial, that is, they concluded that tariffs were 
less efficient than an income tax for bringing in revenue. Others had to do with the 
greater justice of a tax. The first of these Buenker calls the “faculty” argument. This 
argument is so named because it was based on the premise that the cost of running the 
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government should be apportioned according to individuals’ ability to pay. Related to 
this argument was the growing sense that “equality” did not demand an equal 
contribution in terms of dollars, but an equal share of one’s wealth or income.  It was 
also widely noted that not only were the poor paying a greater share of their income to 
the government, but they were also paying a greater dollar amount because of their 
dependence on basic the commodities that were so expensive because of the tariffs. 
The next argument Buenker identifies as the “compensatory” argument.  Because 
the gap between rich and poor had been caused by the government’s tax policy, this 
argument claimed, a new tax policy should compensate the poor for having borne an 
unfair share of the burden.  Interestingly, one of the groups endorsing this argument and 
advocating the income tax was the National Tax Association [NTA], a group of well-to-
do Northern professionals, including “industrialists, financeers, public officials” and 
more.35  Discerning whether or not the NTA’s arguments were genuine, and, if so, 
making sense of how this might have come to pass is the sort of project that would be 
approached differently depending on the method of enquiry with which one begins. 
A third argument for the justice of an income tax is the “benefit” argument. Since 
the rich - the merchants - had more for the government and its military and police forces 
to protect, so the argument goes, they should contribute more to its budget.  President 
Teddy Roosevelt, an important force in the pro-tax movement endorsed this argument.36   
Roosevelt is another interesting case study in this process. Weisman talks about 
the “evolving attitudes toward wealth and fairness at the center of the issue.”37  
Roosevelt’s attitudes certainly changed over the course of his career.  He was born into 
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an upper class family, and as Weisman says, was inculcated with a “distrust of the 
complaints of the working class.”38  Early in his career as a New York state 
assemblyman he dismissed a bill to reduce working hours for streetcar employees as 
“socialist.”39 Yet eventually he became more concerned about the plight of the working 
class.  Apparently first hand observation of the poverty and slums of New York City had 
a profound effect upon him.40  By 1906 he was talking about exploitation in speeches 
and by 1910 he was heading the Progressive party and arguing for concern for “human 
welfare over property rights.”41
It is at least plausible that one’s view about the justice of a matter might be 
influenced by personal encounters with the parties involved.  In addition to his own 
experience, the late 1800s and early 1900s saw a large number of books, both academic 
and fiction, exposing the poverty of the working class and corruption of big business.42  
Perhaps Roosevelt, always known for being independent, was simply persuaded by 
argument to change his position.  Yet a case can also be made that his shift was strategic, 
especially as he began his bid to regain the presidency beginning in 1910.  Similar 
interpretations might be offered for President Howard Taft’s support, albeit admittedly 
tepid, for the income tax amendment.  Taft came from a wealthy family and his party 
(Republican) was officially opposed to an income tax. 
Jerold Waltman writes that while the government was primarily guided by the 
interests of the elite, elected officials also had to keep “an eye on the masses.”43  While 
Roosevelt, Taft, and most of the elected officials of the time had much to gain from 
wealthy business interests in the form of campaign contributions, not to mention their 
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natural sympathy they felt due to their belonging to the same social and economic 
classes as the businessmen, they nevertheless relied on the general population to elect 
them.  If public opinion was in fact being influenced by the newspaper reports of 
corruption and popular literature highlighting the conditions of the working class, 
perhaps the wiser politicians saw a need to break from the position of their peers to 
preserve their own power. It is difficult to know exactly what to make of this. 
Political scientists Thomas Dye and Harmon Ziegler argue that “opinions flow 
downward from elites to the masses,” and that “public opinion rarely effects elite 
behavior.”44  Dye and Ziegler contend that public policy “reflects the interests and 
values of elites,” not the general public.45 If this is the case then the change in public 
opinion around the turn of the century must have been orchestrated or at least indirectly 
prodded by the governing elite. In addition to the question of how they might have 
managed this are more pressing questions such as why they might have done this and 
how we might discern that this is, in fact, what happened.  
One possible explanation for why the wealthy and powerful elite might have 
moved to institute a tax on their own wealth is that, strangely enough, an income tax 
may have actually increased and solidified their power and ability to control and exploit 
the under class.  According to Weisman, the Tammany Hall political machine in New 
York managed to protect the interests of business while at the same time presenting 
themselves as a defender of the poor by providing them with jobs and occasional 
handouts.  Tammany managed to keep the working class under control by keeping them 
poor and dependent on the seemingly generous charity of the party bosses.46  It may be 
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that the federal government saw an opportunity to keep the working class dependent by 
offering them more services. Such a strategy dates back to ancient Rome.47  
Weisman says that the “rising expenditures” of the McKinley administration 
“were the signposts of America becoming a modern social welfare state.”48 It appears 
that one of the factors in New York’s eventual vote in favor of the federal income tax is 
that their own social welfare programs were becoming so expensive. Greater revenue for 
the national government would mean more chance of aid for the state’s programs.49
Dye and Ziegler write, “when the Sixteenth Amendment gave the national 
government the power to tax incomes, financial power shifted from the states to 
Washington.”  They note that following this shift in power, the federal government 
started several grant-in-aid programs.  Quickly, individuals and local governments 
became dependent upon these federal programs.  As previously noted, federal spending 
increased from $4.84 per capita to $7.01 per capita between 1890 and 1913, during the 
same period the population increased 85%. If the politicians endorsed these spending 
increases they must have understood that a need for greater revenue would follow.  One 
might argue that despite levying a tax that only the wealthy, politicians included, would 
have to pay, these elites were still acting in their own self- interest. A small percentage 
of one’s income could be considered a reasonable price to pay to not only gain control 
over the working class but to also appear generously philanthropic in doing so. 
An alternative argument might propose that while the Republican dominated 
congress passed the amendment and sent it out for ratification, and the Republican 
President endorsed the proposal, the Republicans had no intention of actually bringing 
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about an income tax through these actions.  Weisman says that supporters were not 
optimistic as the amendment went to the states.50 A motion to allow the states to hold 
popular votes instead of sending the amendment to the legislatures was denied. It may be 
that the politicians who did not want the tax but also did not want to be seen as going 
against public opinion proposed the amendment thinking that it would never pass but 
that their actions would be appreciated by the public nonetheless.  A defeat for the 
amendment would settle the matter and have the added benefit of transferring blame 
away from the Republicans. 
Both of these arguments rely on interpreting the actions and statements of the 
agents involved in the promotion of the Sixteenth Amendment as necessarily self-
interested; and they do so while considering self-interest to be concerned only with 
material prosperity.  Neither supposes that it is at least possible that the motivations and 
explanations for the actions of those such as Roosevelt could have actually been truly a 
function of having been convinced of the justice of the tax. It is at this point that I return 
to the stipulation that the student of history must be able to interpret not only that which 
happens, but that which doesn’t happen. 
If one assumes that individuals are led to act according to their class interests, 
which, in turn, are understood in terms of material or financial conditions, one must be 
consistent in considering these interests to be overriding.  My point here is that concerns 
for democracy, or American traditions, or the Constitution must either be seen to further 
these interests or be trumped by them.  What did not happen in this story is striking. The 
powerful and wealthy leaders of business and industry and their peers in government did 
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not seek to control the press in order to shape the national consciousness. They did not 
decide to bring about a new form of government, getting rid of the Constitution.  They 
did not attempt to use force.   
It does not appear that any of these options were even recognized as such. Yet, 
just over a hundred years prior the wealthy elites of the colonies had organized an armed 
revolt against their leaders. A few years after that they replaced the Articles of 
Confederation with the Constitutions.  Less than 50 years before the ratification of the 
Sixteenth Amendment the nation had been at war with itself.  In the context of the 
history of civilization the American experiment was still new and unproven; other 
countries that had flirted with democracy had failed and still others would fail and revert 
to monarchy or some form of totalitarianism throughout the twentieth century.  
Why did the powerful work within the system as they did?  Why did so many of 
the wealthy and powerful either endorse the income tax or, even when they did not 
endorse it, allow it to come to pass and accept it as law? It is in answering specific 
questions such as these that the differences between the two methods of historical 
enquiry become clear.  Either we interpret the actions of the participants in this event in 
terms of their classes and self-interest or we allow that perhaps there are other 
explanations that will not fit this mold. 
I will not attempt to prove a particular explanation for the ratification of the 
Sixteenth Amendment. What I do hope to show, however, are the ways in which Vico 
and Marx offer two distinct methods of studying and explaining this event that rely on 
competing theories about how to recognize and interpret the relevant data.  I want to 
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examine the epistemological assumptions of each and suggest a way for adjudicating 
between the two.  Both are powerful and persuasive; both can make sense of the facts 
and even offer an answer to the other.   
The two accounts are incompatible and comprehensive, meaning that there is no 
external standard of history by which to judge them.  Making a choice between the two 
is not simply about choosing a view of history; it is also about choosing a view of the 
present and future. Which method one chooses will affect how one anticipates policy 
developments in the future, and, more importantly, how one seeks to influence and shape 
public policy now and in the years to come. 
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CHAPTER III 
GIAMBATTISTA VICO’S NEW SCIENCE 
Giambattista Vico’s New Science, first published in 1725, was an attempt to 
offer a scientific approach to the study of human society and history. Following Isaac 
Newton’s Principia (1687), which offered a systematic explanation of the physical 
world, and established “Rules for Reasoning in Philosophy,” there was a demand for a 
similar accounting of a science of humanity.51 Although Vico is notoriously obscure -- 
he is neither as organized or as precise as Newton -- his work is brilliant nonetheless and 
we can extract from his work something like Newton’s “Rules for Reasoning in 
Philosophy.”52  In this chapter I will draw out and explain the significant features of his 
work.  What will become clear is that Vico offers an original method of historical 
inquiry with its own standards for knowledge and understanding. Though it is more 
accurate to say that his method is asserted rather than defended, it will be useful to 
examine it and its implications in order to contrast it with the rival method presented by 
Karl Marx, which will be discussed in the following chapter.  Later, I will draw on the 
work of Alasdair MacIntyre in sustenance of Vico’s posited method. 
In Section III of Book 1 of the New Science, Vico expresses the foundational 
premise of his method: 
 But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so 
remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of a 
truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society has certainly 
been made by men, and that its principles are theretofore to be found 
within the modifications of our own human mind.53  
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It is important to note several points in this passage. First, that society has been 
made by men and that we can therefore understand society, is considered a truth beyond 
question.  This appears dogmatic at first, but I hope to show, given Vico’s conception of 
human reason, such a truth is literally beyond question, that is, this truth is actually the 
foundation of reason and therefore is not something reason could question. As such it 
plays a part in Vico’s philosophy similar to the part played by the law of causation in 
Kant’s philosophy: it is prerequisite for rendering experience intelligible. A corollary to 
this point is that the “eternal and never failing light” of reason does not shine beyond the 
earliest societies.  In other words, the world of pre-social humanity, if such a thing 
exists, is necessarily shrouded in darkness. Observation, even imagined, of the actions of 
pre-societal individuals, such as we will find in Marx’s work is, for Vico, an 
inconceivable endeavor because society is what provides the context that illumines and 
makes intelligible the behavior of individuals. 
Third, the human mind, its nature and workings, are not fixed.  The project of 
historical inquiry is to examine “the modifications” of the mind.  This remains possible 
because the minds of fellow humans are never altogether different from ours; however, 
we cannot presume uniformity. As Isaiah Berlin notes, “His [Vico’s] revolutionary move 
is to have denied the doctrine of a timeless natural law, the truths of which could have 
been known in principle to any man, at any time, anywhere.”54  This is because there is 
not, as Berlin explains, “only one structure of reality.”55 For Vico there are no innate 
ideas as Descartes had argued, nor are there any categories of experience that we can 
know a priori as Kant would later argue.  
 
 29
The epistemological principle implicit in the above extended quote from Vico is 
expressed in depth in his earlier work, On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians 
(1710).56  This principle is that the true (verum) is the same as what is made (factum). 
The true, or that which is known, is the same as that which is made because the act of 
knowing is the act of putting together the elements of the thing that is known. It may be 
easiest to explain this position by contrasting it with other, more familiar, theories.   
For example, rationalists such as Plato and Descartes posited that we are able to 
identify the objects we experience because we recognize these objects as resembling 
some innate idea of same.  Following in this tradition, Kant supposed that the human 
mind has necessarily various categories and concepts through which and according to 
which the raw data of experience is ordered and processed.  
To the contrary, the empiricist John Locke denied any innate ideas or necessary 
categories, and instead declared that the mind, beginning as a blank slate, was able to 
cobble together the basic qualities of experience to form ideas of objects.  Though he 
denied the existence of innate ideas, Locke supposed a common capacity for such 
composition along with the basic reality of entities in the world as such.  In other words, 
it is for us to discover the structure of the world and the objects in it. 
Vico’s theory is distinct from each of these theories, though perhaps closest to 
Locke’s. As with Locke, Vico does not appeal to any innate ideas or categories. Unlike 
Locke, though, Vico did not assume it as given that persons would organize the raw data 
of experience in a certain way.  “Human truth is what man puts together and makes in 
the act of knowing it.”57 Humans create concepts, or universals, according to which we 
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divide up the world, and thereby know the nature of these things. “God knows all things 
because in Himself He contains the elements with which He puts all things together. 
Man, on the other hand, strives to know these things by a process of division.”58  
Whereas Locke assumes that experience comes to us in what he identifies as 
primary and secondary qualities, and it is for us to know the objects in the world through 
the correct organization or composition of these qualities, Vico argues that knowledge 
comes through division of the raw data of experience. There are no basic units that we all 
perceive and which are left to us to reassemble. 
In describing our formation of knowledge and the true in terms of division, Vico 
is similar to Aristotle. Aristotle argued that through a process he called “abstraction” we 
perceive the forms of reality.  Yet the difference between Aristotle and Vico on this 
matter is significant.  Whereas for both the methods of apprehension might appropriately 
be called abstraction, the processes are not the same.   
For Aristotle abstraction is done well when one discerns correctly the natures or 
forms truly present in matter. For Vico, however, such a performance is something we 
could never actually achieve. Ironically, Vico’s reasoning for this contention rests on a 
distinction he shares with Aristotle.  Aristotle distinguishes between the ability to name 
something accurately and the ability to explain what makes a given thing the thing that it 
is. Though experience can give knowledge, he says, “Men of experience know that the 
thing is so, but do not know why, while the others know the ‘why’ and the cause.”  
Wisdom “is knowledge about certain causes and principles.”59  
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Vico also associates understanding with grasping causes.  For Vico, however, the 
type of cause one must grasp in order to truly know something is not a material cause but 
what might be identified with what Aristotle calls a “formal” cause. “For to know is to 
grasp the genus or the form by which a thing is made.”60 When it comes to natural 
objects this just is not the sort of knowledge we can have.  “Of course, the physicist 
cannot truly define things, that is, he cannot assign to each its own nature and thus truly 
make it, for that is God’s right but is unlawful for man. So he defines the names 
themselves, on the model of God.”61  Since God creates, and creates with intention, only 
God can truly know the natures and purposes of the things he creates.  We can, however, 
create names, which we can understand because we create them, and then apply them to 
the world, dividing it up and placing names on the categories we create in so doing. 
We can know the world only insofar as we know the categories and concepts we 
create to name the things in the world, which we perceive through abstraction; 
abstraction is performed in accordance with the concepts.  Thus, our knowledge of the 
external material world is not certain.  Still, and this is the point that is most significant 
for this study, because we do create human institutions, conventions, and customs, and 
not through abstraction, we can know them and understand them.  These institutions, and 
not just their names, come to be because we create them.  They are the product of human 
action and intention. Vico writes, “Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the 
philosophers should have bent all their energies to the study of the world of nature, 
which since God made it, He alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study 
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of the world of nations, or civil world, which, since men had made it, men could come to 
know.”62
As noted above, the epistemological principle at work here is that we can know 
that which we make. I can know that which I make because I know my own intentions 
and purposes. We, as a people, can know that which we make because we know our own 
intentions.  Physicists do not make matter, they do not create motion, biologists do not 
make plants, and zoologists do not invent animals, but people do create institutions and 
societies and perform actions and therefore can know institutions and societies and 
actions in a way that other types of scientists cannot know their subjects. 
Accepting this, one might nevertheless wonder how we, as historians, can know 
that which was made many years in the past, by peoples and cultures other than our own.  
The faculty that assists this endeavor Vico calls fantasia, or imagination. Though, as it 
has famously been argued, we cannot know what it is like to be a bat, we can imagine 
what it must have been like to be another person in another place and time. As we will 
see, this ability is neither something innate, nor automatic; it is conditional upon 
participation in common institutions and practices and may require a good deal of work. 
Vico says that his New Science is to “be at once a history of the ideas, the 
customs, and the deeds of mankind.”63 Imagination is what allows us to understand the 
ideas, customs, and deeds of others.  Vico considers imagination to be “nothing but 
extended or compounded memory.”64 As Berlin explains, a person is able to understand 
himself because he can “reconstruct imaginatively (in Aristotle’s phrase) what he did 
and what he suffered, his hopes, wishes, fears, efforts, his acts and his works, both his 
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own and those of his fellows.”65 The means by which we understand ourselves are the 
same by which we understand others.  This is made possible by the nature of language. 
History is preserved, however obscurely, in “the memories of the communities of 
the peoples.”66 It is language that unites communities and transmits their memories. 
Language arises only after the formation of community and it does so because of the 
“need to explain and be understood.”67  Language and community are intimately bound 
together and neither is possible without the shared memories that make relationships 
possible and provide standards for appropriate usage; maintenance of meaning is in turn 
essential for the maintenance of relationships and community. 
Vico holds that there are three fundamental institutions that all societies have in 
common. These institutions are foundational: they tie the community together and 
provide a framework within which action and intention become intelligible by 
establishing goods and ends around and towards which the community is oriented.  
The first of these institutions, and the first form of community, is marriage, 
which produces families, which in turn are the “seed-plots” of commonwealths.68 The 
other two institutions are burial and religion.  
Burial is a necessary institution for society because without it the bodies of the 
deceased would “remain unburied on the surface of the earth as food for crows and dogs. 
Certainly this bestial custom will be accompanied by uncultivated fields and uninhabited 
cities.”69 Burial, then, is necessary for community because without it the community 
could not maintain cities; the community would have no home.  
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An implicit premise in support of this conclusion is that the living would not 
want to encounter the decaying bodies of the dead.  This presupposes a felt connection 
between the living and those who go before them. Burial then serves the practical 
purpose of removing dead bodies from sight, but it also serves the symbolic, ritual 
purpose of establishing respect for the past. 
Marriage and burial both establish relationships and obligations of service and 
support between the able and the weak. Because neither children or the dying are able to 
care for themselves, nor can the dead bury themselves, these institutions are necessary 
for maintaining and sustaining society for any period of time. Vico’s insight that these 
institutions are essential for society is a sign that he recognized a basic fact about human 
life that seems to have gone overlooked in the many and various social – contract 
theories. This fact is that society is made up of many more than able-bodied adult men. 
Children, the elderly, the sick, the disabled, these make up a greater portion of any 
society than do the able-bodied adult men.  Radical dependence and inequality of ability 
are inescapable features of any society and, more importantly, every individual life, and 
for society to survive institutions must be in place to provide for the care of those who 
have nothing to offer in return. 
Because the nature of such institutions is that they cannot be formed through an 
agreement between equals, Vico surmises that a third institution is necessary for 
bringing into being the former two. Religion is essential and universal because it is the 
recognition of God “which imposed form and measure on the bestial passions of these 
lost men and thus transformed them into human passions.”70 Vico supposes that religion, 
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providing both a source of goodness and fear of God, is the impetus for self-control and 
prompts vows of fidelity and responsibility, both to one’s offspring and one’s ancestors. 
Certainly, pre-societal persons were not completely solitary; the sex-drive did not appear 
only after marriage. Yet, sex and procreation are neither sufficient for, nor equivalent to, 
marriage. Without the custom of marriage, “parents, since they are held together by no 
necessary bond of law, will proceed to cast off their natural children. Since parents may 
separate at any time, the children, abandoned by both, must lie exposed to be devoured 
by dogs.”71 Religion is the initial impetus behind both marriage and burial and it is also 
what sustains them in the face of diversions and distractions.  
A fourth condition, in addition to these three institutions, is necessary for 
community. With the formation of community comes the need, as noted above, to 
explain and be understood.  Language satisfies this need.  More specifically, the ability 
to name satisfies this need and naming requires abstraction. To explain and to be 
understood, to be able to think, one must be able to use general names, not only for 
objects but also for concepts, actions and intentions, among other things.  
Because, according to Vico, there are no innate ideas or necessary structures of 
thought, and because we are not God, the creator of all things, these names, or 
universals, had to be created; thus, Vico concludes, the first language speakers were 
poets – creators of names and meanings. This is the “master key of this Science.”72 The 
first language speakers must have created “imaginative genera” with which to categorize 
the objects in the world. They were poets insofar as they used metaphor to create a world 
of intelligible particulars.  
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This is the master key for historical inquiry because it lets us know both the 
general strategy and the specific tactic for discovery of the past. The strategy it points to 
is not one of introspection nor of the opposite error, which is a quest for materialistic 
explanations. Instead, the strategy is one of recreation; the specific tactic for 
accomplishing this is imagination.  
We can make sense of what people did and why they did so because, as Vico 
stipulates, “of the indefinite nature of the human mind, wherever it is lost in ignorance 
man makes himself the measure of all things.” Furthermore, “It is another property of 
the human mind that whenever men can form no idea of distant and unknown things, 
they judge them by what is familiar and at hand.” 73  
All human societies share the three necessary institutions of religion, marriage, 
and burial; it follows that all humans share “the common sense of the human race.”74  
Therefore, we can relate to, or understand, at least in part, how these first poets created 
their world. With the formation of these institutions people “began to think humanly,” 
and our imagination therefore is able to extend to them.75  
Having been formed through participation in these three common institutions, we 
are able to understand the basic framework, and orientation within this framework, of 
those who came before us. Archaeologists and anthropologists are able to conclude that 
ancient structures such as Stonehenge and various pyramids served as calendars and 
astrological devices because the moon, the Sun, and the stars still hold their places in 
relation to these structures. If the orbit of the moon around the earth or that of the earth 
around the Sun had changed significantly, insight into the purposes of these devices 
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would be impossible for us. It is only because we can place ourselves in the same 
positions in which the builders of Stonehenge stood, and look to the same sky to which 
they looked that we can discern their intentions. Similarly, it is only because we can 
place ourselves in the familial relationships and societal frameworks as ancient people, 
and appreciate the same ends they pursued, that we can begin to see the world as they 
saw it and imagine their projects and pursuits. 
Grasping this point is essential for understanding Vico’s science. Human 
thought, or, more truly, humanity, begins with these institutions. Biologically, the human 
race existed before these institutions, but these people are inaccessible to us because 
“their minds were not in the least abstract, refined, or spiritualized.”76 These institutions, 
because they shape our communities from which our language springs, provide us with 
what Vico calls a “mental dictionary,” common to all.77 Again, abstraction follows the 
creation of concepts; our key to understanding the world as these people saw it is that 
their abstraction was not random, it proceeded from a model with which we have 
intimate familiarity because it is the basis for our own thought and self-understanding. 
What Vico has offered here is something truly brilliant. He has offered a non-
foundationalist foundation for knowledge.  Though Vico preceded both Hume and Kant, 
it will help to illustrate the significance of Vico’s move if contrasted with these two 
prominent, later philosophers.   
Hume had challenged both rationalists and empiricists who sought to offer 
support for certainty. He offered powerful arguments that our descriptions of experience, 
and our judgments about causation and morality, are simply matters of convention. In 
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response, Kant proposed a transcendental foundation for knowledge. He argued that the 
structure of our minds necessarily orders experience in certain ways.  He thereby tried to 
establish criteria for judgment and the uniformity of human reason. His masterful work, 
the Critique of Pure Reason, was, at least in part, an attempt to provide a justification for 
certainty in mathematics and science. 
Hume famously said, “reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions.” 
Hume argued this because he believed that the concepts through which we view the 
world and according to which reason makes judgments are neither correspondent to 
objects in the world nor necessarily applied to them.  Therefore, our description of the 
world, and the judgments that follow from these descriptions must be products of 
passion, not reason. Though Kant conceded the point that we at least cannot know the 
true nature of the things in the world, our minds necessarily and universally interpret 
experience through specific categories and concepts and therefore our judgments can 
follow strictly from reason.  
For the historian, neither position is attractive. The Humean position limits 
drastically the potential field of study for the historian.  If there is no necessary, 
universal structure of reality or experience, and all descriptions of the world and all 
judgments made in the world are matters of custom or taste, the historian is limited to 
studying the history of his or her own culture. He or she would have no access, no way 
to grasp the conventions of other, distant cultures because there is no rule or key by 
which we can understand these conventions. The beginnings or foundations of 
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conventions would be untraceable as they would be random, not admitting of scientific 
study.78
The Kantian position is different but no better for the historian. This is because 
the Kantian rational being, insofar as he or she is rational, and therefore free, is stripped 
of those characteristics that identify him or her as a particular individual.  Judgments 
made by pure reason, that is, reason untainted by passions or contingent factors such as 
experience or location, are made by a person acting according to his or her essential 
nature, and therefore uninfluenced by the vagaries of particularity. Much like the self of 
Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, the person as thinker, as rational being, is essentially (in the 
literal sense of the word) a bare particular. When the self is identified as such without 
any relation to the world or others around him or her, and therefore without any 
reference to duties, roles, or ends, the historian’s task of interpreting actions, or even 
identifying actions as such is either impossible or must be redefined (which is one way 
of understanding Marx’s work).  
With the Kantian understanding there is no way for an observer to determine the 
nature or proper description of the action because all that the observer can see are the 
physical aspects, or, for the historian, the consequences. But for the Kantian the action is 
defined, and thereby judged morally, based on the intention of the actor, not the 
consequences, which may have nothing really to do with the intention. In the classic case 
Kant considers of the possible duty to lie to protect another, the act of truth telling could 
be identified in multiple ways depending on one’s perspective. Given that in this case the 
actor expects consequences that he neither desires nor intends, the historian’s task of 
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identifying the action properly is impossible. He or she cannot know the intentions of the 
actor and would presumably be examining the consequences to determine the actor’s 
intentions and character. Thus the historian would either have to study consequences, 
and not actions per se, or would have to study overt behavior and its material causes. 
The former is unappealing because it does not provide lessons upon which one might 
draw for guiding future action, which is a large part of the motivation for studying 
history; the latter has its difficulties as well, these will be addressed at length in the 
following chapters. 
Vico rejects philosophies that seek to identify some necessary essence of 
humanity which is possessed universally and which particularity only serves to obscure. 
He is critical, for example, of Descartes for the knowledge of his own existence upon 
which Descartes builds his epistemology is not knowledge of one’s self, nor is it self-
understanding. Certainly it could not be used to explain or even describe one’s own 
history. Michael Polanyi expresses this point clearly when he writes that the Cartesian 
and Kantian endeavor reflects, “a passion for achieving absolutely impersonal 
knowledge which, being unable to recognize any persons, presents us with a picture of 
the universe in which we ourselves are absent.”79 The “I” of “I think therefore I am,” 
does not name any full person who has actually lived in this world, it simply refers to 
some plain locus of thought. 
What Vico’s work does is provide a way to understand humanity as a universal 
without losing the ability to appreciate humans as particulars.  Because all human 
thought is shaped by the universal practices of marriage, burial and religion, there are 
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some things about reason and experience that are necessary and hold universally. Yet, 
the identity of individual persons is incomplete apart from their membership in a 
particular community in a particular time and place.  Much about judgment and 
experience is conventional, but because of the universal basis for human thought and the 
necessary conditions for conventions to form, we can through imagination come to 
understand the actions of persons in other times and cultures. 
According to this view, the particular participates fully in the universal while at 
the same time remaining unique. Those features that mark the individual’s particularity 
are neither extra nor unessential to the identity of the individual. There is difference 
within the unity of individuals participating in the universal because it is part of the 
nature of these individuals that they are embodied in particular times and places, formed 
by and through their experiences that, because of their embodiment, are all necessarily 
unique. Thus, those experiences that are contingent contribute to the identity of the 
individual. This difference and particularity does not, then, conflict with, nor do violence 
to, that which is universal in the individual. Instead it provides the individual with an 
identity. Rather than obscuring that which is universal and essential in humanity, the 
particular features of an individual are the means by which the universal is presented. 
These universals that form and are formed by communities and cultures, which 
enable communication, expression and understanding, are neither necessary and 
transcendental, as Kant would argue, nor are they arbitrary or random or inaccessible. 
These universals are of the sort described by Colin Gunton as “avowedly mediated 
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through finite experience whose shape is in part determined by the historical and cultural 
contexts in which it takes place.”80   
This is an unusual understanding of the nature of universals. They are not static, 
independent ideas; they are not known innately nor through contemplation, but through 
practice. They are only intelligible given familiarity with, and participation in, certain 
practices. We can grasp those foreign to us through imagination because despite their 
being foreign they are nonetheless formed in communities that share the most basic 
formative practices of marriage, burial, and religion. 
I have noted above, briefly, how and why these three practices are taken to be the 
foundations of human thought and community. At this point further explanation is in 
order. The three foundational institutions serve two purposes in this context. The first is 
that by bringing about and maintaining community they bring about language. Language 
allows for reason and judgment thereby providing an impetus for action other than 
bodily needs and desires. The second service that these institutions perform is to provide 
for individual identity in relation to others; with these institutions come ordered 
relationships with duties, roles, and purposes, thereby providing a context within which 
one can make judgments and rendering the actions of others intelligible as such.  
Prefacing his explanation of the necessity of these institutions for the historian’s 
project, Vico writes, “men, because of their corrupted nature, are under the tyranny of 
self-love, which compels them to make private utility their chief guide.”81  Pre-societal 
persons, with no language, and therefore no ability to reason using universals, are unable 
to recognize any imperatives for themselves other than physical gratification and 
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preservation.  They have no duties to others; they can recognize no way they “ought” to 
act because they lack the necessary framework with in which to make categorical 
judgments. The pre-societal person is essentially an animal and cannot be considered 
free in any historically or morally significant sense.  
According to Vico, the necessary first step toward becoming recognizably 
human, and, as such, free, is recognition of God. Vico is not as helpful as he might be in 
explaining why this must be the case, yet what he does offer is enough.  He posits that 
the “first men… must have done their thinking under the strong impulsion of violent 
passions, as beasts do.”82 As such, these men were not free, and we cannot accurately 
consider their behavior to be action. Yet, by examining the earliest poets and the 
theology present in their poems, songs, and myths, we find a clue that points us to an 
explanation of their ability to break the causal chain of the passions.  Here we can see 
that their imputing the motions of nature (such as thunder and lightning) to some 
“frightful” deity gave them a model from which “must have sprung the conatus proper to 
the human will.”83 It was, for example, the impression that thunder expressed the 
displeasure of god that gave the earliest people cause to “hold in check the motions 
impressed on the mind by the body.” These people would have already been disposed to 
look for God because “man, fallen into despair of all the succors of nature, desires 
something superior to save him.”84 Contrary to Hobbes who supposed that persons in the 
state of nature would join together in a federation to alleviate their nasty and brutish life, 
Vico holds that prior to being able to make any such decision, people must have turned 
to God.  He says, “Without religion no commonwealths can be born.”85 Fearing that God 
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was angry with them led them to consider their own actions and control their passions. 
This was the birth of the will, so to speak, a prerequisite for making pacts and forming 
alliances.86  
The recognition of God brought about the birth of the human will that sought to 
transform the “bestial passions” into human passions. The emergence of this will and the 
resulting human passions led to the institution of marriage. As Vico describes it, “bestial 
lust” brought men and women to seek each other’s company, and “the stern restraints of 
frightful religions” kept them together and established the family.87   
The family is important for several reasons. First it establishes for individuals an 
identification of one’s own interests with those of others. That is, the man who marries 
and has children, for example, now identifies the interests of his wife and children with 
his own interests. As families expand and communities are formed, the man now 
identifies the interests of the community with his as well. With this institution and the 
accompanying expansion of interests, come family and community roles that provide 
individuals with an identity and make the actions of others intelligible as in pursuit of 
some commonly recognized end. Persons thus never act as persons simpliciter, but as 
husband, son, brother, father, friend, and so forth.  
Families, because they produce and care for children, are also important for 
maintaining and preserving the language and reason of the community. In a sense, burial 
performs a similar role because, in addition to removing dead bodies, thereby making 
cities inhabitable, the burial ritual helps to instill a respect for the traditions and customs 
of the past, strengthens the relationship between generations, and encourages the 
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identification of self-interest with the interests of the community. Burying the dead 
shows respect for one’s elders and, because burial is something one cannot do for 
oneself but for which one must rely on others, with no possibility of holding them to 
their commitment, it necessitates trust and respect between generations and depends for 
its perpetuation on a sense of duty to others.  
Participation in these three institutions is what forms community, allows for 
language and reason, and makes persons human.  It is because all persons are formed 
through these institutions that we, despite our differences, can understand the actions of 
others in the past. We can make sense of their actions because, with the aid of the faculty 
of imagination, we can understand their intentions and obligations and how they saw the 
world. Still, one might ask how, if as Vico says, it is “beyond our power to enter into the 
vast imagination of those first men” who lived before these institutions were formed, we 
can truly understand the significance and nature of these institutions.  Explicit in Vico’s 
story is the premise that we cannot understand the behavior of people prior to their 
participation in these institutions. Therefore, it looks as if the formation of these 
institutions cannot be understood as intentional activity; at the very least it seems that we 
could not claim to be able to recreate imaginatively their birth. How, then, can we 
understand these institutions and the role they play in our lives if we did not intentionally 
make them?   
This is a serious objection to Vico’s theory. As Bruce Mazlish asks, “how can we 
really claim that man consciously ‘makes’ his history?”88 In addition to Vico’s 
recognition that the mind of pre-societal man is inaccessible to us, he repeatedly 
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acknowledges that the objects of history are often the unintended consequences of 
human action. He says his New Science is a “history of the institutions by which, 
without human discernment or counsel, and often against the designs of men, providence 
has ordered this great city of the human race.”89 If what is made is made accidentally, 
can we still know that which is made? 
A parallel and potentially more damaging objection is, allowing that we can 
know that which we make, how can we know ourselves if we are not responsible for 
making ourselves? Vico says in On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians, “For the 
mind does not make itself as it gets to know itself, and since it does not make itself, it 
does not know the genus or the mode by which it knows itself.”90 This is potentially 
more damaging because this calls into question the reliability of the faculty necessary for 
historical knowledge, imagination. If we do not make ourselves, it is not immediately 
clear how can know ourselves; and if we cannot know ourselves, how can we really 
know our intentions and thereby know that which we make? 
This last question is fundamental for historical inquiry and is logically prior to 
any endeavor in this field. I contend that there are two general paths one can take from 
this point. In other words, there are two basic ways of answering this question. These 
two ways are the ways of Vico and Marx and their versions of historical inquiry are the 
two referenced in the title of this present work. I say that this question is fundamental for 
historical inquiry because how it is answered will determine the units of observation, the 
method of study, and the types of conclusions one draws. I say that there are two basic 
ways of answering this question because one either posits that humans act freely and 
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thus seeks to understand their intentions, as Vico does, or one posits that human actions 
are not free and therefore seeks determining material factors to explain behavior, as 
Marx does. I shall try to make clear in what follows that this question is the point of 
divergence for these two philosophers. 
Marx writes in Capital that he agrees with Vico that “the essence of the 
distinction between human history and natural history is that the former is made by man 
and the latter is not.”91 He therefore agrees that human history should be more accessible 
to us than natural history.  But how and why this is the case is much different for Vico 
and Marx.  
The preliminary premises for the study of human history are quite similar for 
these two philosophers. In fact, one can cite passages from the two that are strikingly 
alike. Vico stipulates that, “Men first feel necessity, then look for utility, next attend to 
comfort.”92 Later he explains, “In search of these natures of human institutions our 
Science proceeds by a severe analysis of human thoughts about the human necessities or 
utilities of social life.”93  Marx argues in The German Ideology, “The premises from 
which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which 
abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their 
activity and the material conditions under which they live.”94  And again, “life involves 
before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. 
The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the 
production of material life itself.”95  
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However, the similarities end here because Marx does not trust Vico’s method of 
historical inquiry. Whereas Vico is undaunted by the objection that the faculty of 
imagination might not be trustworthy because we do not make ourselves and our actions 
often have unintended consequences, Marx seeks different units of observation and a 
different faculty for making judgments about history. Marx thinks that the language and 
consciousness that emerge from the foundational institutions obscure rather than 
illuminate human history. Despite this objection, Vico maintains that, “history cannot be 
more certain than when he who creates the things also narrates them.”96 Marx could not 
be more certain that this is not the case, writing, “Whilst in ordinary life every 
shopkeeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and 
what he really is, our historians have not yet won even this trivial insight.”97
Marx proceeds to describe language, consciousness, and human institutions as 
following from the quest of individuals, in the settings in which they find themselves, to 
meet their physical necessities. For Marx, human nature is observed, or assumed to 
obtain, in these pre-societal individuals; human history is the story of this nature being 
obscured and hindered by society and its institutions. Vico, however, holds that human 
nature only emerges after the formation of society following the appearance of the three 
primary institutions. Whereas Marx does not consider the individual in society to be 
truly free and therefore looks for material causes to explain behavior, for Vico, 
individuals can only be considered free once they are members of society. It is then, and 
only then, that reason can be understood as guiding the movements of persons and only 
then that there is a framework within which the historian can identify these movements 
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as actions and render them intelligible. The following chapter is devoted to describing 
and explaining Marx’s method; the remainder of this chapter will focus on the reasons 
for Vico’s persistence in the face of this objection. 
There are two strains of argument that we can find in Vico’s writings that help us 
understand why he is untroubled by the role of chance, or divine providence, in the 
formation of human institutions and society. The first has to do with his understanding of 
the nature of freedom. He thinks freedom is only possible in the context of a society. The 
second reason has to do with his conception of the nature of reason and scientific 
inquiry.  Vic contends that historians are bound necessarily by their own particularity; 
there are no concepts available to the historian that are intelligible independently of 
place and time.98 There is no way to view the past through a lens wiped clean of the 
framework of tradition.  Furthermore, apart from tradition, the concept of “law” that is 
necessary for scientific thought is absent. Thus, as imperfect as imagination may be, it is 
our only hope for historical insight. 
For Vico freedom is more accurately described as autonomy; a person is free 
when he or she truly governs him or herself.  Persons become truly human when they 
“hold in check the motions impressed on the mind by the body.”99  There are several 
necessary conditions for autonomy. First, there has to be a self; before there can be self-
governance, there must be a self to be governed. Second, there must be a law according 
to which the self is governed. Third, this law must be chosen or accepted; a body that 
behaves in a law-like manner that could not behave otherwise is not autonomous. Fourth, 
following from the third, this law must have authority; in other words, the individual 
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choosing the law must have some reason to do so. Independently of society, none of 
these conditions obtain. 
The pre-societal person is governed by “bestial passions.”  He or she has no 
concept of will, no concept of choice, movement follows pursuit of the fulfillment of 
these passions.  As detailed above, it is only with the sense of a displeased divinity, a 
displeased, powerful other, that the concept of self begins to emerge along with the 
concept of law.  In fact, Vico traces the concept of law to the first concept of God, or 
“Jove.” He notes that the Latin “ius,” meaning “law” was a “contraction of the ancient 
Ious (Jove).”100 The awareness of self as self is only possible when defined against 
something over and above the self.  Without an other, there is no impetus for defining or 
examining the self. Without something not only distinct, but also different and greater 
than the self, there is no impetus to recognize the self as limited or to understand others 
that are distinct but not different as such. In other words, for Vico, without the concept 
of God, an individual person would not have the necessary framework for recognizing 
other persons as the same as oneself. Prior to this awareness of the divine, then, persons 
were not self-conscious and could not, therefore, be self –governing. 
This initial concept of law is necessary for the ability to think using universals. 
Universals are names. Names are types of signs that operate in a law-like way, always 
used to designate the same thing, or the same property in distinct things. The word 
“name” derives from “nomos,” the Latin word for “law.” The ability to use names and 
think with universals is necessary for judgment. Judgment is necessary for obedience to 
a law. Without judgment and law, movements would be driven by passion and impulse 
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and would not be free. The transition Vico describes here is the transition from mythos 
to logos as the guiding principle according to which the world is perceived and 
understood. His argument is that prior to any perception of order and assumption of 
coherence or non-random conformity or regularity in nature, one must first have a 
primitive conception of law. This, he thinks, is necessarily subsequent to an awareness 
of divinity and the properties of persistent power and constant will. 
When, with the formation of society, persons begin to “think humanly,” they do 
not lose their bodily urges and “bestial passions.” Obedience to the law, then, is always a 
choice no matter how much it may also be a matter of custom.  Persons looking back in 
time at the actions of other humans, or at the actions of their peers, can recognize actions 
as the result of obedience to a law because they know of their own capacity for choice 
and for obedience or disobedience. 
Finally the choice to obey law and control one’s passions must follow from some 
recognition of the authority of the law. Persons cannot create the law for themselves for 
two reasons. First, to do so would nonetheless require acceptance of concepts, which are 
laws in themselves, according to which judgments are made, and which emerge from the 
practices of society. Without concepts with which to legislate and without some sense of 
justice to guide legislation, any law legislated by the self could only have its origins in 
the natural passions of the individual and therefore would neither be truly human nor 
freely chosen. 
In order for something to be an object of choice it must exist before the choice is 
made; it must be given. As Iris Murdoch writes, “I can only choose within the world I 
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can see.”101 The world within which we see is created through the concepts following 
from practice. Furthermore, to be chosen an object must be recognized as being good. 
Vico says, “When a truth owes its existence to the mind that knows it, then the true 
coincides with the good.”102 The authority of God comes from His being the “author” of 
the concept; God is authoritative concerning marriage, for example, because He is the 
creator of the concept and its goodness.   
It is important to appreciate Vico’s conception of human freedom in order to 
understand his reliance on imagination and his remaining unperturbed by the obscurity 
of the exact nature of the origins of society.  For Vico, as for Kant, freedom and reason 
are necessarily tied to each other. Humans are only free insofar as their actions follow 
from the use of reason. Yet for Vico, unlike Kant, the use of reason does not preclude 
the use of emotion; actions from reason and actions from emotion are not necessarily 
distinct. In this sense, Vico is again similar to Aristotle. In fact, looking at some of 
Aristotle’s writings can help elucidate and support Vico’s position. 
Aristotle explains in the Nicomachean Ethics103 that moral excellence has to do 
with pleasure and pain, and that moral education is education in feeling pleasure and 
pain at the “proper things.” Such moral excellence requires, then, among other things, 
self-control. Self-control is a virtue and allows us to be free from the “bestial and 
slavish” passions that humans share with the animals.104 The person who has self-control 
can abstain from bodily pleasures and enjoy doing so; self-control and exercise of the 
virtues lead to specifically human pleasures and are pursued for this reason. 
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The exercise of these virtues requires wisdom, the ability to judge properly and 
to recognize the good. The good for a particular thing is determined by its function. 
Humans only have discernible and definable functions within the context of a society 
and its institutions. So, freedom requires self-control, and self-control is only possible 
when the person in question has some good towards which to orient himself, some 
means of judging properly with the goal of feeling properly. Reason is made possible 
only in society because society provides the framework for naming and the context for 
making judgments. Reason is used both in the choice to cultivate the individual’s 
enjoyment of the right things and in the actual pursuit of this enjoyment. Thus, reason is 
not a slave of the passions, as Hume said, but, one might say, the chooser and cultivator 
of the passions. 
In “The Iliad or The Poem of Force,” Simone Weil defines “force” as “that x that 
turns anybody who is subjected to it into a thing.”105 A person who becomes a thing is 
no longer free; his or her movements are no longer intelligible as actions with intentions, 
but movements caused by force. We are moved by forces outside of us and by the force 
of our natural, animal passions; self-love can also be an overwhelming force.  “A 
moderate use of force, which alone would enable man to escape being enmeshed in its 
machinery, would require superhuman virtue.”106 This virtue is what Aristotle calls self-
control, and what Vico considers to be what makes us human, that is, what allows us to 
rise above the level of animals.  
Freedom from the force of our passions, the ability to choose and control them, is 
only possible within the context of a society that provides institutional roles and, 
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thereby, an orientation to the good. A free action is one chosen in accordance with 
reason, but this does not entail for Vico, as it does for Kant, the absence of emotion. 
Actions motivated by emotions properly felt at the proper occasions are the product of 
reason and virtue. Virtue allows for a choice between animal and human passions.   
Imagination is a reliable faculty, allowing us to understand our own past actions 
as well as those of others, because the three institutions, which in their original form 
were not made by men, are nevertheless the foundation, or basis, for all choice and 
thought. They are the prerequisites for human thinking. We cannot understand pre-social 
humans, and we did not create the three institutions in their original form. Still, because 
there is no human thought before or apart from these institutions, there is no human 
nature for them to obscure or distort. Admittedly, accessibility to the distant pass may 
admit of degrees, with more remote times being less clear to us, but the initial opacity 
does not block inquiry because as soon as humans participate in these institutions and 
practices, they begin to shape them to their particular circumstances and basic needs, and 
in so doing become the authors of the particular incarnations of these institutions. 
Though the initial making of these institutions may not be understood as intentional, 
these institutions are forever being remade and each subsequent creation can be 
recognized and understood as intentional. Because families play a foundational role in 
society, children are raised with the customs and concepts of the society. Each person is 
shaped by the stories, customs and concepts of their community. Thus, as Charles Wood 
describes them, “concepts… are creatures of history: they come into being, are molded 
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and occasionally transformed through their complex and flexible relationships to other 
concepts and to the particularities of human existence.”107
So, the object of study for the historian can be the actions of individuals and 
societies as they understood them and reported them. These actions can rightly be 
understood as being free and, therefore, the historian need not seek elsewhere for causal 
explanation. Because, and only because, the actions were free can we truly call them 
actions; this gives us a means for naming properly and restricts us from renaming 
according to some perceived universal or eternal standard. Furthermore, because these 
actions are free and can be understood in themselves, as they are, and need not and could 
not be explained more accurately with other concepts, the faculty the historian must use 
to grasp the framework within which these actions took place is imagination. Failure to 
appreciate the necessity of employing imagination will lead to the anachronistic 
application of concepts and assumption of intentions.  
The ability to call action following from emotion or passion “free” is essential to 
Vico’s project. Without it, there is no way for the historian to understand what “it must 
have been like” to be those persons in the past the historian is studying. If freedom is 
understood only in the Kantian sense, or if the possibility of freedom is denied 
completely, the historian has no need to study particular individuals, for they are all just 
role players and interchangeable, and the project of history now becomes much more 
like the reconstruction of some past physical event than an attempt to know “what it 
must have been like.” “Without some ability to get into the skin of others, the human 
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condition, history, what characterizes one period or culture as against others cannot be 
understood.”108
This conception of freedom is radically different from the one we will find in 
Marx’s writings and which is expressed with illuminating clarity by Hegel. Hegel writes, 
“When I will what is rational, I act not as a particular individual, but in accordance with 
the concepts of ethics in general, in an ethical act I vindicate not myself but the thing. 
But a person who does something perverse gives the greatest prominence to his 
particularity.”109 Working with this understanding of freedom and particularity, and 
operating from the observation that persons are blinded by their particularity and as such 
are not free, Marx seeks the causal determinants of human activity. That is, he seeks to 
understand the perversions of the universal essence of humanity and their causal 
efficacy. Marx declines to attend to thoughts and ideas in themselves in seeking 
explanations for historical events because he follows Hegel who held that “this process 
whereby the particular is superseded and raised to the universal is what is called the 
activity of thought.” And, “here is the point at which it becomes clear that it is only as 
thinking intelligence that the will is truly itself and free.”110 In other words, a person qua 
particular is not really free; his or her action does not proceed exclusively from his or her 
essence as a person but is influenced, perverted, by this particularity.  
To the contrary, Vico argues that it is only insofar as one is a particular that one 
is fully a person. Both sides presented here hold that reason, the ability to think, is the 
essential identifying feature of personhood; the question at the bottom of our quest to 
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adjudicate between these two rival versions of historical inquiry is whether particularity 
is necessary for this feature to obtain or an obstacle to its exercise. 
Vico’s philosophy directs us to identify events and individuals as unique, as 
particulars, and therefore as the proper objects of study. Yet it also allows us a way to 
compare these unique individuals and events and to apply the knowledge we gain about 
them to our own endeavors in shaping current and future events. His historical method 
is, therefore, a method for a science of particulars, which is really a remarkable feat.  
By proposing a way to study human history that does not deny human freedom in 
particularity he enables historians to tell stories about persons whose lives are familiar to 
us and with whom we can identify. This recognition of freedom, though, does not 
prevent the historian from making generalizations or finding lessons applicable to the 
present and future. This science may not generate laws and it may not produce predictive 
certainty, but it does offer a uniform method for finding understanding. Its goal is a 
different type of knowledge than is sought after in the physical sciences and its method 
is therefore appropriately distinct.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
KARL MARX’S PURE EMPIRICISM 
 
Karl Marx never devoted an entire work, or even an extended portion of a work, 
to explaining his philosophy of science or exactly how history could be studied 
scientifically. In order to grasp the nature of Marx’s method one has to extract his 
thoughts on the matter from his various works and piece them together, drawing further 
on his practice of this science to form a coherent picture.111 This piecing together is the 
project of this chapter. I will not be concerned to explain in detail the results of Marx’s 
observations, but rather the approach he takes to his study. 
Marx is especially interesting as a philosopher of science because he is an 
empiricist who does not trust appearances.  As Adrienne Fulco writes, “For Marx… it is 
reality and illusion that are the true opponents in history.”112  Marx’s unique contribution 
is to offer a system of inquiry into the essences behind appearances without appealing to 
gnostic insights, rationalist premises, or extensive metaphysical commitments.  Such 
appeals are not necessary for Marx because the problem to be overcome is not the 
fallibility of our senses, nor the incomplete reality of the things we encounter in the 
world, but rather the given framework through which we perceive the world. Thus, 
Fulco’s characterization is apt; illusion and reality really are opponents in Marx’s view 
and the illusion is man-made. The competition is for acceptance; in this competition 
illusion actively obscures reality.  The problem is not that all we have access to is 
illusion and it is not that our senses necessarily distort reality; reality is always present 
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and perceivable but perception of reality requires discernment. The term Marx uses for 
this discernment is “unmasking,” the procedure for unmasking is “critique.” 
Marx’s skepticism results from a distrust of the authority of tradition and he 
therefore calls for a “ruthless criticism of everything existing.”113  Previous accounts of 
history have been built on metaphysical, that is, religious, assumptions and attempted to 
fit historical data into an assumed framework.  Instead, “In direct contrast to German 
philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to 
heaven.”114 Marx will begin with observable, concrete data and build his theory from the 
data, not interpret his data according to an assumed theory.  
Criticism of existing thought or explanations consists of refusing to take 
historical explanations on authority, instead questioning them, putting them to the test by 
performing one’s own observations.  To do so one must strip away the given framework 
and begin with the raw data of unfiltered observation. Marx writes, “the reader who on 
the whole desires to follow me must be resolved to ascend from the particular to the 
general.”115 The given framework that must be stripped away is that of ideology and 
received assumptions about social reality. It is the story that is told about society and its 
members that obscures or denies reality and thereby keeps individuals from freedom. 
In order to explain the nature and origin of ideology it will help first to begin 
where Marx does, with the first premises of the study of history. 
Marx strives for a purely empirical approach to the study of human history. 
“Where speculation ends—in real life—there real, positive science begins.”116 This 
study must begin with the observation of individual persons rather than ideas or 
 
 63
institutions because individual persons are both ontologically and temporally prior to 
ideas and institutions.  This notion is repeated throughout Marx’s writings. “It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being 
that determines their consciousness.”117 This is echoed in “The German Ideology” where 
Marx discusses this at greater length.  “We do not set out from what men say, imagine, 
conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive 
at men in the flesh.”  This is because these thoughts and conceptions are produced by 
men; they are the “efflux of their material behavior.” In the same way, institutions are 
also the product of “the life process of definite individuals.”118 Persons produce ideas, 
not the other way around, and institutions are only abstractions, persons are concrete.119 
Ironically, these very abstractions ultimately serve to shape consciousness. Individuals 
then end up being bound and constrained by the concepts that were in the first place 
produced to serve them. Therefore,  
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, 
but real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the 
imagination. They are the real individuals, their activity and the material 
conditions under which they live, both those which they find already 
existing and those produced by their activity. These premises can thus be 
verified in a purely empirical way (emphasis added).120
 
Historical inquiry must begin with the observation of individual humans and the 
material conditions in which they find themselves. There are two reasons for this. The 
first is that only such observation can be purely empirical and, therefore, trustworthy. To 
study ideas and institutions in the hope of understanding human behavior would be to 
bestow upon them an independent ontological status that is just not empirically 
warranted. The second has to do with the implicit Aristotelian notion that one can only 
 
 64
understand something if one knows its cause. Ideas and institutions cannot be understood 
in abstraction from their causes which are individuals and their interaction with the 
material world in which they find themselves.  
This initial interaction with the world in which they find themselves is 
intelligible because of the basic, empirically verifiable fact that “men must be in a 
position to live in order to be able to ‘make history.’ But life involves before everything 
else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things.”121 Thus, a 
critique of the prevailing story of humanity and society begins with a stripping away of 
all that is theory-laden, all that is given, and builds a new story starting with those basic 
premises that are purely empirical. 
Through this stripping away Marx finds the key to understanding the nature of 
society and consciousness.  Whereas Vico understood the project of history to be 
understanding the free actions of men and women in the past and found the key to this to 
be the faculty of imagination, Marx understands the project of historical inquiry to be 
possible only because men and women are not truly free. It is through the recognition 
and appreciation of life’s necessities that the historian can trace the story of history.  
Were it the case that nature provided all that people needed, removing the need for labor, 
there would be no history.122 For Marx, then, human history begins with labor, not 
consciousness; labor is Marx’s master key.  
“The first historical act,” that is, the first act that we as historians can identify, 
recognize, and explain, “is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs 
[eating, drinking, habitation and so forth] and the production of material life itself.”123 
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This initial production of the means of survival simultaneously produces new needs.  
Then, “men, who daily remake their own life, begin to make other men, to propagate 
their kind.” Thereby the family is created. The production of the means of survival, the 
production of new needs, and the family, all “have existed since the dawn of history and 
the first men.”124  
As Terrence Ball notes, once the historian begins with the Marx’s first premise of 
human history, “everything else follows from the need to produce means of 
subsistence.”125 These definite human individuals whose existence is the starting point 
for the study of history immediately begin to organize themselves in cooperative 
ventures for survival. Labor is the master key for deciphering history because these 
individuals have to labor to survive. A purely empirical approach must begin with just 
human individuals and their physical surroundings. Theory must follow from 
observation so it cannot be used to explain observations of the first actions of these 
individuals.  The recognition of the necessity of labor provides a way to interpret and 
explain these initial observations without using non-empirical theories of motivation and 
intention. 
The form of labor and the way the first individuals organize themselves is 
determined by the material conditions in which they find themselves. This organization 
requires language. According to Marx, “Language, like consciousness, only arises from 
the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men.”126 The form or nature of this 
consciousness will be the result of the nature of this intercourse; it will follow from the 
structure of the organization, or society, that forms around labor. 
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If labor and labor relations determine consciousness and language then the 
actions of individuals and societies can be explained and predicted with empirical data 
and without appeal to metaphysical entities such as universals and concepts such as 
justice or goodness or spirit. 
The causal relationship between labor and consciousness is not perfectly law –
like; consciousness is not merely an epiphenomenon of labor. As Franz Jakubowski 
describes it, the relationship is that of base to superstructure and though the 
superstructure is dependent upon the base, it also influences the base.127
It has already been noted above that Marx distrusts consciousness, he considers 
his project to be aiming at a reform of consciousness. In fact, he says that consciousness 
presents the world to us as does a camera obscura, that is, upside down.128 At this point 
it remains to be explained both how labor produces this deceptive consciousness and 
how the careful observer, i.e. Marx, could become aware of this.  
The first task is to explain how consciousness develops in such a way as to 
obscure reality. Consciousness begins as “merely consciousness concerning the 
immediate sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other 
persons and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious.”129 Quickly, as 
individuals organize themselves and work together to produce their means of survival, 
labor roles are divided. This is seen initially in the natural and necessary division of 
labor in sex and childbearing. Later, labor is divided according to such accidents of 
individual difference such as strengths and needs. The critical division is the division 
between mental and physical labor. This is critical because “From this moment 
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consciousness can flatter itself that it really is something other than consciousness of 
existing practice, that it really represents something real.”130 This is the beginning of 
theology and philosophy, the beginning of theoretical thought in general.131 Jakubowski 
explains that it is this “separation of mental from physical labor that permits the 
existence of a consciousness which believes itself to be independent of material factors. 
Ideology, i.e., false consciousness, originates from this circumstance.”132  
Not only does this division of labor result in the illusion that consciousness is 
something distinct from actual being and practice, it also results in what Marx calls “the 
contradiction between the interest of the separate individual or the individual family and 
the communal interest of all individuals.”133 So, there are two ways in which 
consciousness becomes false or illusory and the second way builds upon the first. The 
mistaken belief, which follows from the division of mental and physical labor, that 
consciousness is independent of material factors, or as Marx might put it, independent of 
being, leads individuals and societies to look for the true meanings of words and 
concepts. People begin to ask, for example, what “goodness” really is, or begin to 
assume that, because thought is distinct from practice or being, the aspect of persons that 
does the thinking must be distinct from the physical body. In other words, moral 
philosophy, metaphysics, and religion arise from this mistaken notion, namely, that 
consciousness is independent of material factors. 
Once one recognizes this phenomenon, it is easy to anticipate the second way in 
which consciousness is falsified. Following the advent of questions about the true 
meanings of moral concepts and the true nature of the self are those who offer 
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authoritative answers to these questions. Because mental labor is already divided from 
physical labor, those involved in mental labor become the authorities. This class already 
rules over the physical laborers, now the answers they give to these questions serve to 
strengthen and perpetuate their rule.  
Marx writes, “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas,” 
and “The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant 
material relationships.”134 What this means, as Terrence Ball explains, is that the ruling 
class does not rule by force alone, rather, another factor is even greater, “its ability to 
influence, if not control, the thoughts, the beliefs and ideas – the ‘consciousness’ – of the 
working class.”135 It is not necessarily the case that the ruling class plots and 
purposefully puts forward a false consciousness, though this may indeed happen in some 
cases. Instead, following Marx’s explanation for how consciousness develops, those 
whose lives are dedicated to thought and are not actively involved in physical labor will 
not only have the time to engage in abstract thought, but will have their consciousness 
shaped by their own practices and conditions. The ideology that develops will confirm 
and affirm the lives of those producing the ideology. The working class will tend to 
accept the illusions put forward by the ruling class because the working class is simply 
too busy to devote time to thought and will accept the authority of those already 
designated as thinkers. 
“Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the ruling individuals and, 
above all, from the relationships which result from a given stage of the mode of 
production,…it is very easy to abstract from these various ideas ‘the idea,’ the notion, 
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etc., as the dominant force in history.”136 Ideas are taken to have an existence of their 
own, philosophy develops to study these ideas, and history becomes understood to be 
driven by these illusory entities. The historian who attempts to explain historical eras 
and events by examining the leading ideas of the time, perceiving them as causally 
efficacious, will actually have mistaken cause for effect. Again, “It is not the 
consciousness of men that determine their social being, but, on the contrary, their social 
being that determines their consciousness.”(See above, page 3.) 
It is out of these conflicts of interests between the individual and the community 
and between the thinking/ruling class and the working class that the State emerges.137 
Marx explains that, “the State is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert 
their common interests.”138 Although “The state is an abstraction. The people alone is 
what is concrete,” because the state is granted an independent existence through 
abstraction, the good of the state is set in opposition to the good of the individual.139 In 
fact, as Jakubowski notes, “the emergence of the state presupposes that there is already 
an opposition between individual and social interests.”140
Marx’s explanation of political thought and discourse follows the same pattern 
explained above. Although it is truly nothing more than the form society takes on 
according to its material conditions and methods of production, because of the divorce of 
being and consciousness, it comes to be seen as an abstract entity. Theories about the 
origin and nature of the state arise, as do arguments about sovereignty and legitimacy.  
The division of labor that begat the separation of practice and thought and the 
granting of independent existence to predicates sets individuals at odds with one another 
 
 70
and makes these individuals beholden and subject to illusory entities like the state. 
People, and peoples, become bound by laws and political systems. Therefore the lesson 
for the historian is that the state is just the superstructure, “the form in which class 
struggles occur.”141 If the state is “the form in which the individuals of a ruling class 
assert their common interests,” all of the institutions within the state are the means by 
which this class creates the ideology, that is, the false consciousness that binds the 
working class.  
Concepts such as “law” and “justice” are merely abstractions, part of the 
ideology that allows the state to suppress its subjects. The ideological superstructure is 
“the form in which men become conscious” of the class struggles that are manifested in 
the political and legal superstructures. Once again, if the historian attempts to explain 
political events by reporting on the dominant or emerging ideas about law and justice, he 
or she will fail to recognize the true forces of change in human society, for “The history 
of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.”142 Changes in society do 
not follow from changes in ideas, instead, changes in ideas, or consciousness, follow 
from, and are expressions of, changes in material conditions and in social relations.143 
The historian should not study what men have said and written about themselves and 
their time but should instead study the economic conditions and changes. The latter can 
be studied “with the precision of natural science,” while religious, moral, and 
philosophical conflicts are just the “ideological forms in which men become conscious 
of this conflict and fight it out.”144
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These ideological forms are necessary for the state’s existence and survival. As 
Jeffrey Reiman says, “Ideology refers to ideas that represent society in its best light, as if 
it were the highest expression of universal ideas.”145 These ideas are perpetuated by the 
state and become institutionalized and entrenched. The citizens or subjects of a state, 
then, necessarily live in a condition of false consciousness. This false consciousness is 
not simply a state of error or misunderstanding about the nature of the world and state, it 
is more than this. This false consciousness is also false self-consciousness. The stories or 
traditions that inform the self-understanding of the citizens and the conditions in which 
they live and work distort or obscure their true essence. This condition of false self-
consciousness is called alienation.  
Alienation, or estrangement, results from labor, and, in turn, ideology, and is a 
condition of separation of an individual from his or her essence. Erich Fromm explains 
that “the concept of alienation is based on the distinction between existence and 
essence.”146 The division of labor results in the alienation of being and thought. Labor in 
general results in the alienation of an individual’s body from himself. A man’s body 
becomes an object, a tool, and his life becomes something he “has,” and something he 
works to preserve, leaving the man in opposition to himself.147 “The alienation of self-
consciousness establishes thing hood.”148 Man’s essence as subject is estranged from his 
existence as object. 
Alienation is an important concept in Marx’s theory of history and not just in the 
sense that it is a diagnosis of a pervasive condition. It plays two additional significant 
roles. The first is eventual catalyst for the communist revolution that will bring about the 
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end of history. When alienation reaches its highest stage, when man as subject is 
completely separated from man as object, this alienation will become recognizable, the 
alienated man will become conscious of his essence and his situation and this will lead to 
revolution.149
If the first role is mechanistic, the second is explanatory. The condition of 
alienation helps to explain why, as Marx claims, “History must… always be written 
according to an extraneous standard.”150 The apparent and felt motivations of historical 
agents are not reliable because these individuals are alienated from themselves; their 
own essences are hidden from them. Alienation is the key to understanding why, despite 
the “illusion of free will,” history can still be studied with scientific precision.151 For 
Marx, if historical changes were truly the results of free will, they could not be explained 
by empirical observation. The end of alienation, then, will mean the end of history. It 
will also mean the end of philosophy. 
Marx understands his role as helping to bring about this end. One of the most 
often quoted passages in all of Marx’s writings is the eleventh, and final, of his “Theses 
on Feuerbach.” This thesis states, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in 
various ways; the point, however, is to change it.”152 Philosophers have only interpreted, 
and reinterpreted ideology, consciousness alienated from reality, and therefore have 
neither changed nor improved the world. Heretofore philosophy has just been “empty 
talk about consciousness.”153 Philosophical problems only arise because of the divorce 
of being and essence that causes and perpetuates false consciousness. “When reality is 
depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of 
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existence.”154 Philosophy is in the service of history, when philosophy depicts reality, 
when it unmasks the truth, its job will be done and the progression of history will be 
complete. The aforementioned revolution that will follow from the proletariat’s 
recognition of their alienation as such will “bring their ‘existence’ into harmony with 
their ‘essence’ in a practical way.”155  
The concept of alienation is the linchpin in Marx’s science of history. Without 
this concept there is nothing to move history and, more importantly for the purposes of 
the present project, no way to account for the historian’s ability to trace and explain the 
movement of history. Therefore, at this point I will begin a closer examination of 
alienation. 
There are several reasons alienation allows the historian to trace and explain the 
movement of history. One reason is that the alienated individual is not free. Though this 
individual has the illusion of free will, the individual’s actions are determined by his or 
her consciousness, which is a function of the class to which the individual belongs. The 
fact that the alienated individual is a member of a class allows the historian to identify 
and understand the actions of a given individual without having to observe the individual 
directly. The nature of the historian’s endeavor is such that he or she cannot actually 
observe the actions of his or her objects of study (because they happen in the past and 
are only recognized as objects of interest after the fact). Identifying a person as a 
member of a class allows the historian to treat this person as an instance of a universal 
and not as an indeterminate particular. Thus the historian can maintain an empirical 
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approach to the science without direct observation and without having to rely on the 
reporting of untrustworthy witnesses (such as the historical actor himself). 
There are some implicit premises that are necessary for these conclusions about 
alienation to be warranted. These premises have to do with the nature of freedom and 
human essence. We can discern the presence of these implicit premises if we look 
closely at what is stated explicitly. First, if only alienated actors are potential objects of 
historical study (because these actors are not free), it must be the case that free actions 
are not possible objects of scientific explanation. Second, if persons can be recognized as 
alienated from their essence, it must be the case that there is a human essence and that 
this can be known. Third, if empirical observation is the only reliable method for gaining 
knowledge, then this knowledge of the human essence must have been gained 
empirically. These three implicit premises need to be discussed because none of them 
are obviously true. 
G. A. Cohen writes that for Marx, “history is a substitute for nature.”156 What 
this means is that human history, the story of labor and labor relations, introduces 
necessity into human behavior and thought. Because men have to work to survive and 
their consciousness is determined by the particularities of this necessity, their lives and 
actions become determined and predictable, though not necessarily in a perfectly law-
like way. The physical and mental development of an individual is not determined by the 
individual but by the vagaries of his or her particular circumstances. Nature, or the 
natural world, is a possible object of scientific study because natural things do not move 
with intention, rather they are moved; they do not have free will and therefore their 
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movements can explained by the scientist through empirical observation alone. Free 
actions, because they cannot be explained through empirical observation alone, are not 
proper objects of scientific study.  
This position is plausible, but on closer examination one finds that it entails 
positions that are less so. To begin to explain why this is the case I refer briefly to Vico’s 
position. Recall that Vico held that only free human actions are possible objects of 
scientific knowledge. This is because the faculty of fantasia allows us to recognize and 
understand the actions of others. Events in the natural world are beyond our complete 
understanding because there is just too much about them and the rest of the world that 
we do not know and cannot perceive empirically. But, contrary to Marx, Vico held that it 
is only when persons act as particular persons that their actions are free and are therefore 
intelligible to us. Yet Marx considers such persons, acting according to their given 
societal roles, as not free. In “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” he writes, 
“The tradition of all the dead generations weights like a nightmare on the brain of the 
living.”157 Because any actions that are intelligible only within a given tradition are by 
definition products of the consciousness of this tradition, these actions are not free.   
Again, this may seem plausible and simply a restating of the position. But 
formulated in this way it becomes clear that any action that could qualify as free would 
be unintelligible to the observing historian.  A free actor would be one who existed 
independently of any particular tradition, whose mode of existence was not dependent on 
any received consciousness or on the circumstances of the individual’s place and time. 
Marx says, “A being only considers himself independent when he stands on his own 
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feet; and he only stands on his own feet when he owes his existence to himself.”158 Of 
course, this sort of independent existence is just what Marx sees as the end of history, 
following the revolution of the proletariat.  However, because free actions, under this 
conception of freedom, are necessarily unintelligible to those of us who stand within a 
tradition, and because such free actions are never intelligible through empirical 
observation, two conclusions seem to follow. The first is that this understanding of 
freedom could not be the result of empirical observation, thus making its admissibility 
questionable given Marx’s stipulations about scientific rigor. The second, a corollary of 
the first, is that freedom is really an empty concept, defined apophatically, its referent is 
unknown. Because it is not something we can experience or observe, it cannot be known. 
Neither is it something that we can understand through imagination because it is unlike 
anything we can experience. It differs from anything we might experience not in degree 
but in kind. Therefore, we literally cannot imagine what would motivate free action or 
how a free individual might choose to act.  
Two further points seem to follow from this last conclusion. Lack of freedom, or 
unfreedom, can no longer be explained simply in contrast to freedom. If a concept is 
empty, explaining a second concept as being the opposite of the first is unhelpful.  This 
is a difficulty for Marx’s theory because of the centrality of the concept of alienation.  
If alienation is explained, at least in part, in terms of lack of freedom, and 
freedom is an empty concept, then alienation becomes unintelligible. If the essence from 
which the individual trapped in the prison of particularity is alienated is one that is 
unintelligible, one must question not only how the historian could properly describe the 
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condition of the individual as one of alienation, but also how the proletarian could be 
expected to recognize his own condition as one of alienation and dependence. It just is 
not clear how one could understand what the true essence of humanity is.  
Marx considers activity to be free activity when it is creative, productive activity 
done for its own sake, and not for the satisfaction of some other need.159 Yet the ability 
to recognize free activity as such seems impossible based on empirical data alone 
because this judgment is a judgment about intention and state of mind. The activities of 
free individuals will not necessarily be different from the activities of alienated 
individuals, what will be different is the motivation for the action. In The German 
Ideology, Marx says that in the communist society it will be “possible for me to do one 
thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear 
cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming 
hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.”160 Hunting, fishing, and shepherding are neither 
free nor alienated types of labor in themselves. It is the intention and consciousness of 
the actor that makes these actions free or alienated. 
Is it the case, then, that Marx’s science of history relies on an empty concept and 
premises that by their nature cannot be known through empirical observation? If so this 
would present a devastating blow to his theory. I suggest, though, that the situation 
might not be so dire for Marx. By reexamining his starting point, and by supplementing 
our analysis of his system with an appreciation for the way in which he understands 
reason to work, we see that Marx’s conclusions about freedom and human essence are 
not without foundation. 
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We begin again with the “first premise of all human history,” namely, “the 
existence of living human individuals.” If we take Marx at his word and suppose that his 
science builds from this first premise using only empirical observation, we must pay 
attention to what Marx says about the distinguishing characteristics of humans. The 
observer of human history can determine that humans “begin to distinguish themselves 
from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which 
is conditioned by their physical organization.”161 This production is not the same thing 
as crude labor. As Marx tells us in Capital, Volume One, “Labour is, in the first place, a 
process in which both man and Nature participate.”162 Other animals build things, for 
example, spiders build webs and bees build hives, “But what distinguishes the worst 
architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination 
before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that 
already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement.”163
Marx builds his conception of human nature from observation of the behavior of 
individual persons. He does not develop a definition or theory about human nature and 
then name as human all entities he encounters who fall under this definition or theory. 
Nor does he abstract an essence from the actual being and practice of individual humans. 
In other words, he does not choose some aspect of human existence, such as thought, 
and, having separated it from the physical practice of production to which it is naturally 
wedded, deem it the essence of humanity. Instead, Marx finds that what distinguishes 
humans, what can be called their essence in the sense that it is the characteristic that 
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must be present for an entity to be called human, is intentional productivity. This is 
derived plausibly from empirical observation. 
Still, the determination of the essential property of humans, intentional 
productivity, which might also be called creativity, is not enough as stated to develop the 
concept of alienation. This is the point at which we need to examine Marx’s 
understanding of reason. Marx recognizes in each individual this property of creativity. 
Yet he also recognizes that each individual he observes is located in a particular place 
and time and faced with particular material conditions. These particular conditions 
account for the differences in ends pursued by these individuals and in the means and 
methods of their pursuits. This observation of difference is evidence of the potential 
latent in each individual. The fact that each individual’s particular circumstances are not 
the result of his or her choice shows Marx that the particular potentialities that a 
particular individual makes actual cannot be the result of that individual’s essence alone, 
but also of the given particularities of his or her existence. If the actions of each 
individual truly were the result of the individuals’ essences alone, this would mean that 
each individual was a species in him or herself, thereby making scientific study of them 
impossible. Science requires both universals and particulars. 
Because the potential actualized by each individual does not emerge from his or 
her human essence alone, that is, because it does not follow from the individual qua 
universal, but from the individual qua particular, it must be that the ability of each 
individual to actualize his or her potential is restricted or modified in some way. The 
level of restriction or modification may be different for different individuals or groups of 
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individuals (classes) but all are affected nonetheless.  Furthermore, this affectation 
results from, and contributes to, the opposition of these individuals to one another. The 
interests of one individual or group conflict with the interests of another individual or 
group. That this is the case cannot follow from human essence itself because this would 
mean that human essence conflicted with itself. It is illogical that an object qua universal 
could have interests opposed to another object of the same kind because this would 
entail that a single universal could have two opposite and exclusive properties (the 
interests) at the same time. It must be, then, that the opposing interests follow not from 
human essence but from those particularities that distort or obscure this essence. The 
existence of real, observable people is thereby recognized as alienated existence because 
the true, pure essence of humanity is alien, foreign, to these individuals. In none of these 
individuals does the full human essence exist.  
Thus, the concerns raised above about the content of the concept of freedom are 
assuaged somewhat. The state of unfreedom that Marx recognizes does not require for 
its recognition an understanding of what freedom entails exactly. It is not known simply 
in contrast to freedom. Rather, the existence that Marx considers to be lacking in 
freedom is the condition of being limited in one’s expression of, or participation in, 
one’s essence. Freedom is understood in contrast to the lack of freedom, instead of the 
other way around. Freedom is the ability to exercise one’s full, pure humanity. 
The person whose existence coincides with his essence Marx calls a “species-
being.” A species-being lives “as a universal and therefore a free being.”164 The state of 
freedom that will ensue with the emergence of communism “will only be complete when 
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the real, individual man has absorbed himself in to the abstract citizen, when as an 
individual man, in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, he has become 
a species-being.”165 The species-being is an individual whose thoughts and actions and 
interactions are not determined or limited by his existing in a particular time and place or 
by his being defined by particular roles.  
As Fromm tells us, the important freedom of the species-being is not just being 
“free from, but also free to.”166 The “freedom to” is creative freedom. A person, as 
opposed to an animal, produces even when “free from physical need and only truly 
produces in freedom therefrom.”167 Marx also describes this production in the absence 
of physical need as “human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of 
freedom.”168  
Particularity, then, is truly a barrier to human existence and it is particularity that 
Marx thinks history will eventually overcome. Though Marx says of the individual 
person that it is “precisely his particularity which makes him an individual, and a real 
individual social being” what Marx means by particularity is quite different than that 
which plays such an important role in Vico’s science of history. This is made clear by 
the way Marx finishes the preceding quote. It “is just as much the totality— the ideal 
totality” that “makes him an individual.”169  Each individual human, as species-being, 
possesses and expresses the “totality” of human essence. Each person is truly a person 
insofar as he or she embodies the universal essence. Thus, it may be more accurate and 
helpful for purposes of further discussion to refer to Marxian free persons as individuals 
and Viconian free persons as particulars.  
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This distinction helps to capture the nature of the difference between the two 
philosophers’ theories of the science of human history. The Marxian individual is a 
distinct, independent person, but he represents and possesses the “totality” of what it 
means to be human with all of the potential for creativity that goes with it. This person 
has no commitments, obligations, burdens or ends that are not specifically and freely 
chosen by the individual himself; all possible paths are open for this individual. 
The Viconian particular enters into the world with specific roles, commitments, 
obligations and ends already given in virtue of his place within a family and community. 
He depends on the education and nurturing provided by his family and community to 
develop the self-control necessary to act freely. The ends he discovers waiting for him, 
as it were, are made intelligible by his particularity and it is within the framework 
provided by this particularity that he exercises his freedom. 
It remains for us, in the attempt to adjudicate between these two rival versions of 
historical enquiry, to examine closely these two conceptions of human freedom and their 
underlying assumptions about the nature of reason. This chapter now ends with the 
beginning of this examination of the conception of freedom found in Marx. 
The Marxian free individual chooses and acts having awakened from the 
“nightmare” of tradition and his exertion of energy is an “end in itself.” We might ask, 
as hinted above, how this individual makes his choices. That is, how does such an 
individual determine his own ends or assign value in the absence of any value that is 
given? We might also ask how an observer could properly or accurately name such free 
actions. Without a known framework or context, how might an observer recognize the 
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end of any particular action and thereby name it? Even the naming of a simple action 
such as shaking hands requires knowledge of context and intention on the part of the 
observer.  If energy is an “end in itself,” can any action have a more specific name than 
just “free”? Can any action that is truly an end in itself be named accurately with 
reference to some typical end? Actions are often named according to their function in a 
pursuit of an end. In the case of shaking hands, an ostensibly neutral description 
becomes applicable only to a certain type of action in a given context with a given 
function. 
These questions are of interest not only in making sense of the freedom of the 
Marxian individual in the communist state, they are also of interest in assessing the 
success of Marx’s attempt to begin his science of history with purely empirical premises. 
The reason this is the case is that Marx describes himself as ascending from the 
particular to the general, beginning with individual men and their actions, not with any 
theories about their actions. Surely some such purely empirical observation is possible. 
The observation that these individuals would need to eat in order to survive, for 
example, can be discerned empirically without unwarranted theory. An interpretation, 
then, of an action as pursuit of food would be empirically pure.  
An action that might not so qualify is the formation of the family. One of the 
“three aspects of social activity” that are primary and “have existed simultaneously since 
the dawn of history and the first men” is the family.170 Marx’s observation that men 
begin to propagate is certainly straightforward and not theory-laden. His observation that 
men and women and their children form families is not so obviously possible without 
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some non-empirical justification for this appellation. It is possible to propagate or 
procreate without forming a family.  
Although an interpretation of an action as pursuit of food might be empirically 
pure, an interpretation of an action as a wedding, or of a relationship between individuals 
as a family, is not possible using empirical data alone. These designations entail 
recognition of context, imputation of ends, and the prior existence of societal norms to 
provide some criteria of correctness. 
Similarly, Marx’s assumption, much like Hobbes’, that individuals must have 
come together to cooperate for mutual advantage prior to a mutually conceived 
consciousness or language is not clearly coherent. That pre-societal individuals might 
understand the concept of cooperation or commitment to cooperation without any 
societal norms or practices to provide such a concept is questionable as is the possibility 
of an observer recognizing such co-operation as such absent any theoretical framework. 
Membership in a family might be thought to provide an individual with such concepts or 
at least analogous ones on which to build, but if the possibility of family commitments 
without such concepts is also problematic, this appeal will not help. 
What these criticisms amount to is a questioning of the possibility and 
plausibility of reason divorced from tradition and theory. These criticisms challenge 
Marx’s contention that consciousness freed from any tradition can perceive reality as it 
“really is.” Assessing the force of these criticisms is the task of the following chapters. 
G. A. Cohen suggests that to Marx’s famous last thesis on Feuerbach that says 
the point of philosophy is to change history, we should add, “to change it so that 
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interpretation of it is no longer necessary.”171  Interpretation is no longer necessary when 
pure empirical observation is sufficient for naming objects and actions as they “really 
are.” Were such conditions to obtain, individuals could freely and rationally choose their 
ends free of any unchosen tradition or framework. John Rawls imagines and defends the 
possibility of emancipated and unencumbered reason and choice. His work is the subject 
of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
MARX’S CONCEPTION OF REASON 
In this chapter I will introduce an argument that will culminate in the next 
chapter. With this extended argument I hope to make a case for preferring Vico’s version 
of historical inquiry over that of Marx. Ultimately, and put simply, the basis for this 
contention is that the conception of reason found in Vico is more plausible than that 
found in Marx. I begin my argument by pointing out some significant weaknesses in 
Marx’s account of the faculty of reason. To illustrate and highlight these weaknesses I 
compare the understanding of reason at work in Marx with that found in John Rawls’ A 
Theory of Justice.172 In this chapter I am primarily concerned with Rawls’ theory as 
presented A Theory of Justice. I understand that his position changes in later works but I 
am concerned with his arguments in this work, not with Rawls himself as a philosopher 
of historical interest.  
If we were to construe the model of moral reasoning Rawls presents in A Theory 
of Justice more broadly as a general model of the conditions for, and process of, free 
reasoning, we would find a model strikingly similar to that assumed and employed in 
Marx’s historical inquiry. The primary difference between the two models is simply that 
the Rawlsian model is much more explicit and robust. Thus, the purpose of drawing the 
parallel between Marx’s account of reason and what I will refer to as a Rawlsian account 
of reason (which is not necessarily the same as Rawl’s account of reason) is to provide a 
means of introducing a critique of Marx by proxy.  Examining the Rawlsian model will 
allow us to consider Marx’s model as magnified for closer inspection. After discussing 
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the implications of such accounts of reason, I raise several objections and proceed in the 
next chapter to explain their significance in greater detail. I conclude the following 
chapter by showing how Vico’s explanation of reason meets the objections raised 
against Marx’s account. 
Because my approach in this chapter may strike some readers as unusual, a 
careful introduction is warranted. Marx’s version of historical inquiry involves 
assumptions about the way the faculty of reason is exercised both in those persons who 
are the objects of the historian’s study and in the historian himself. By “faculty of 
reason” I mean that faculty of the intellect that makes judgments, both in the sense of 
choosing actions and in the sense of subsuming a particular unit of observation under a 
universal concept or name. In my discussion of Marx and Rawls I will be concerned 
with this faculty as it is at work in their theories rather than the specific conclusions they 
draw or ends their theories pursue.  
The pairing of Karl Marx and John Rawls will seem strange to many readers, and 
rightly so. Their projects are vastly different and their conclusions seem to be at odds.173 
Allan Bloom suggests that Marx’s historicist arguments cast doubt on the very 
possibility of Rawls’ project.174 It does seem as if Marx’s claims about false 
consciousness and the dependence of history on material conditions and class relations 
call in to question the plausibility of deriving principles of justice through the use of 
reason. Yet in this chapter we will see that there are some striking similarities between 
the conceptions of reason and freedom discernible in Marx’s historical method and 
remarks Rawls makes about reason in his experiment involving the original position. 
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Taking what Rawls says about reason in the context of his moral argument, and 
construing it as an account of reason in general, the reader will notice some assumptions 
about human nature, freedom, and reason that sound much like those found in Marx’s 
philosophy that was discussed in the previous chapter.   
Examining Rawls’ work will be helpful because much of that which is implicit in 
Marx is detailed directly by Rawls and is therefore more easily assessed. Furthermore, 
there is a body of literature discussing Rawls’ original position from which we can draw 
in our critique of Marx. Though their projects are vastly different and their conclusions 
at odds, we can find in both an assumption that the faculty of reason can be exercised 
ahistorically and apart from any consciousness of the particular reasoner’s place within a 
tradition. It is this similarity that I will describe and critique.  
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls defends two primary principles of justice. 
The nature of these two principles is not of concern for my project. I am not interested in 
assessing the specific normative content of Rawls’ philosophy, though that is certainly a 
worthwhile endeavor. What is of interest to me here is the thought experiment he 
employs to derive his two principles of justice. Rawls imagines that individuals situated 
in what he calls the “original position,” behind a “veil of ignorance,” would agree to the 
aforementioned principles of justice. It is my contention that the conception of reason 
assumed in this thought experiment is relevantly similar to the conception of reason 
employed by Marx in his historical observations. Rawls believes that the faculty of 
reason can be exercised by persons in this original position. This belief, and its 
implications are what are of concern to me; my intent is to show that if we construe 
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Rawls’ claims about moral reasoning as applying to reason in general we will find a 
fleshed out description of the faculty of reason as found in Marx’s work. 
Before I begin my exposition of the relevant parts of Rawls’ philosophy I think it 
is important to respond to an objection I anticipate will be brought against my project. 
As I noted above, Rawls’ work is a work of moral philosophy, specifically it is a work of 
moral philosophy that proposes a method for reaching moral agreement by avoiding 
contentious metaphysical and religious arguments. It is his goal, and many think he is 
largely successful in this goal, to reason about moral guidelines without venturing into 
these other areas of philosophy. Whether or not Rawls is successful in his project, my 
aim here is to argue that were his project meant to prescribe a method of reasoning 
generally, it would entail certain propositions about personhood and freedom that are 
questionable.  
I anticipate that despite my acknowledgement that I am construing Rawls work 
more broadly than he intends, some will still take me to be misunderstanding the goal of 
his proposed method, or failing to notice the limits he places on the scope of his 
experiment. Such an objection is expressed nicely by Stephen Mulhall when he writes, 
“the structure of the original position… does not embody a general empirical claim that 
persons can (phenomenologically) detach themselves from all their roles, character traits 
and ends at any one time, or a general metaphysical claim that one’s identity as a person 
is not bound up with such matters. The veil of ignorance is a morally driven epistemic 
limit in politics, not the manifestation of a phenomenological or ontological 
hypothesis.”175  I present this objection at this point in my argument simply to ask the 
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reader to bear with me and allow me to make my case. It is precisely this goal of 
presenting an account of reason without committing oneself to any metaphysical or 
epistemological entailments that I aim to address. 
Though it is true that this story about the nature of reason does not include the 
claim to be presenting phenomenological or ontological hypotheses, it nevertheless does.  
Specifically, it is the ontological hypothesis that the faculty of reason can function 
independently of, or unconnected to, any particular embodied existence that I will be 
addressing in this chapter. What I intend to show is that what the Rawlsian account takes 
to be metaphysically neutral in fact is not and that the manner in which he suggests 
reason can be employed necessarily commits him to certain conclusions about 
personhood and freedom. 
Rawls’ original position is  
a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain 
conception of justice. Among the essential features of this situation is that 
no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor 
does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and 
abilities, his strength, and the like… the parties do not know their 
conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities.176
 
The Rawlsian denies, as would Marx, that assuming an ability to exercise the 
faculty of reason under these conditions entails “any claims to universal truth, or claims 
about the essential nature and identity of persons.”177 The point of reasoning in such a 
position is not to arrive at something that might be called “the truth,” instead it is simply 
to provide the necessary conditions for truly free decision-making. This latter point is 
understood and I do not suggest otherwise. Still, though it does not claim to achieve 
 
 94
what might be called metaphysical truth, I will show that this thought experiment does 
entail some assumptions about reason and the essential nature of persons, if not about the 
essential identity of a person. The key similarity between the Rawlsian version and 
Marx’s that I hope will become clear is that both assume that reason is a faculty whose 
exercise is not only not dependent upon the particular identity of the person exercising it 
but is actually hindered or distorted by the particularity of this individual. 
Rawls says that persons are by nature free and equal rational beings.178 The role 
of the original position is to facilitate the derivation of principles of justice that are true 
to this nature by isolating that which is essential and preventing all non-essential features 
from playing any role in this process. This is necessary for “To express one’s nature as a 
being of a particular kind is to act on the principles that would be chosen if this nature 
were the decisive determining element.”179 Following Kant, a free action is understood 
to be that which an individual would choose as “the most adequate expression of his 
nature as a free and equal rational being.” 180 Thus, it is important that the principles of 
justice be derived by persons situated in the original position because, “If a knowledge 
of particulars is allowed, then the outcome is biased by arbitrary contingencies.”181 An 
important distinction between one’s nature as a human being and one’s identity is 
implicit in this formulation. Though there is no attempt to address what is essential to a 
person in the sense having to do with personal identity through time, he is clearly 
operating on specific assumptions about what is essential to a person qua human being. 
One way of putting this would be to say that all persons possess the universal property 
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“humanness” and that which is essential to the specific identity of an individual is some 
further property.   
The faculty of reason is something that is included in the essence of persons qua 
human beings and when exercised by persons acting as such its conclusions can be 
expected to be uniform. That the preceding is an apt characterization of the Rawlsian 
view follows from the contention that a person can reason from within the original 
position and in so doing choose principles of justice that would express his or her nature 
as a human being, yet not be contingent upon his or her identity as a particular human 
being. In other words, if I can reason as a human being, without at the same time 
reasoning as Jake Noland, that which makes me Jake Noland must be some property I 
possess in addition to the property of being human. I say “in addition to” because when 
the knowledge of that which makes me Jake Noland is excluded, that which remains is 
my awareness of my nature as a human being, according to which I choose the principles 
of justice. 
 Because knowledge of that which makes persons the particular persons they are 
is excluded, the original position is a position of freedom in which persons express their 
true, essential nature. “Men exhibit their freedom, their independence from the 
contingencies of nature and society, by acting in ways they would acknowledge in the 
original position.”182  On this view, contingent or accidental qualities distort that which 
is universal and thereby impair the ability of an individual to act freely.  
In this context, then, freedom is not understood simply as the ability to do 
otherwise. Instead, freedom is autonomy- self-governance- and the law that one 
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legislates for oneself must emerge purely from oneself; it may not be the product of 
accidental, and therefore non-essential, qualities or characteristics.   
Principles of justice chosen by individuals not divested of their particularity 
would be, and have been historically, heteronomous. In other words, the principles 
chosen would be and have been varied. As such it must not be the case that they are the 
products of freely made choices. If freely made choices are those which express the true 
nature of the chooser, and the principles of justice chosen by individuals throughout 
history are so different from each other, it must either be the case that these principles 
have not been chosen freely or the individuals making these choices have all had 
different essential natures. The latter conclusion is dismissed implicitly and a priori as it 
would render the project moot. It follows, therefore, that the original position is 
necessary for rendering truly free choices.  
Because individuals in the original position are ignorant of any distinguishing 
characteristics, which means they can choose autonomously, the original position is not 
truly a place where deliberation between persons takes place. There is no disagreement 
behind the veil of ignorance because the knowledge and interests of all parties are the 
same. The conclusions reached in the original position are not affected by the number of 
individuals imagined to be in this position. Any and all rational persons in the original 
position would produce the same principles of justice because the nature that is 
expressed in the choice of these principles is the same for all. This illustrates the critical 
point that particularity is not necessary for the exercise of reason. 
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Rawls imagines not only that persons in such a position could use reason to 
determine the principles of justice, but that we, who are not actually in such a position, 
can know what these imagined persons would conclude. 183 He proposes that we may 
“simulate the deliberations of this hypothetical situation, simply by reasoning in 
accordance with the appropriate restrictions.”184  It is possible for anyone at anytime to 
reason as from behind the veil of ignorance.185 Note here that Rawls does not say that 
everyone does reason as such all of the time or even ever. As mentioned above, because 
people have not reasoned this way the principles of justice that have emerged in the past 
have been as varied as the philosophers and institutions from which they have emerged.  
Interestingly, no explanation is offered for why people are not, in general, 
inclined to reason in this fashion. Nor is there an explanation of how one might come to 
recognize that reasoning while still encumbered with the accidents of time and place is 
not an exercise of freedom. Nevertheless, it is supposed that it is possible for anyone at 
anytime to escape his or her particularity and reason freely. Each of us is able, given 
sufficient reflection, to recognize the conclusions of autonomous reason as such, as well 
as to appreciate the fact that reason as usually practiced is enslaved to contingency. 
The original position is a “point of view removed from and not distorted by the 
particular features and circumstances of the all-encompassing background framework” 
of a particular individual.186 This device is a “device of representation” but its use “does 
not imply that the self is ontologically prior to the facts about persons that the parties are 
excluded from knowing.”187 That both of these conditions could be true entails that that 
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which is represented in the original position is not any particular self, but rather 
something like a universal human essence.  
The reader can begin to see now that the claim that, “To express one’s nature as a 
being of a particular kind is to act on the principles that would be chosen if this nature 
were the decisive determining element” captures perfectly the type of expressive 
freedom possessed by Marx’s species-being (see endnote 6 below). In addition, the 
ability, which is necessarily assumed to obtain, to reason as if one were in the original 
position is the same ability Marx must exercise in order to recognize the condition of 
alienation and false consciousness in which the masses live. Marx’s method of inquiry 
into history requires this ability to free oneself from tradition-bound consciousness and 
reason freely. Without this ability his attempt at a purely empirical science of history is 
doomed to failure. Marx the historian must be freed from any particular paradigm of 
consciousness for him to describe the world as it “really is.”  
For the Rawlsian, the agreement reached through this experiment is “hypothetical 
and nonhistorical.” Allan Bloom echoes this point, albeit with critical intentions, when 
he says, “there is nothing in the original position that corresponds to any man’s real 
experience.”188 The conflicting intuitions about the felicity of such a formulation match 
the fundamental disagreement between Vico and Marx. Vico would deny the possibility 
of the nonhistorical exercise of reason; Marx would hold that only when reason is 
exercised nonhistorically is it exercised purely and freely. For Vico the device of the 
original position would be representative of “No-man,” whereas for Marx it would be 
representative of “Every-man.” Thus, though the Rawlsian would be right to protest that 
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his theory does not pretend to offer a metaphysical account of justice, and would be right 
to deny that his theory entails that the self is ontologically prior to any particular facts 
about it, this theory does, nonetheless, entail that reason can be exercised nonhistorically 
and that the property of being human is ontologically prior to, and distinct from, any 
particular person’s identity. 
The idea of a universal, free self with the ability to create and enjoy a course of 
life must be coherent and intelligible for Marx’s conclusions about persons’ alienation 
from their essence to be convincing. Without the strength of these conclusions, his 
contentions about the proper objects of historical study are unsupported.189 Furthermore, 
such freedom must be possible and conceivable if his thesis about the end of history is to 
be plausible. If my proposed similarities hold, then we can use the more explicit and 
elaborate Rawlsian explanations of these accounts of reason and freedom as well as the 
substantial commentary on Rawls’ original position to aid our appraisal of Marx’s 
position. 
A brief review of Marx’s writings on freedom and essence, when presented 
alongside Rawls’, broadly construed, serves to highlight the important parallels. Marx 
writes in Capital, Volume Three, “the realm of freedom actually begins where labour 
which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases.”190 Necessity 
does not come only in the form of immediate physical need, but also in the form of 
tradition and false-consciousness. Certainly a person might, for example, be bound by 
necessity to patch a roof to provide shelter from the elements. But a person might also 
experience the yoke of necessity as the obligation that comes with an inherited 
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institutional role or the duty one has as a member of society to honor the ideal of 
patriotism.  
Until there is a “sphere of society which claims no traditional status but only a 
human status,” freedom is not possible.191 Tradition limits the individual’s ability to 
express his or her true nature by determining the individual’s roles and ends 
independently of, and prior to, the individual’s choice. When men make their history, 
Marx explains, they do so not “under the circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly found, given, and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all 
the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.”192 A sphere of 
society that claims a “human status” as opposed to a “traditional status” would be one in 
which the individuals live as “species-beings,” that is, as humans qua humans, with each 
expressing the full, universal essence of the species as opposed to that of a limited, or 
encumbered tradition-given role. As such, these individuals choose their ends and 
projects for themselves freely, unburdened by necessity. Their existence, their way of 
being, is therefore free because it is chosen independently of anything external to the 
individual.193  
Marx believes that this mode of existence will be made possible when existence 
is “brought into harmony” with essence “by means of a revolution.”194 He also believes 
that this freedom from tradition and false-consciousness is practiced in his scientific 
method that allows him to observe and describe how individuals “really are.”195
Marx’s species-being, his universal free person, is much like the Rawlsian 
“noumenal self”196 who has “complete freedom to choose whatever principles [he or 
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she] wish[es],” and thereby exhibits “what it means to be a free and equal rational 
being.”197 Marx’s professed ability, despite his being situated in a time and place before 
the revolution of the proletariat, to observe and think independently of tradition and any 
given consciousness, closely resembles the Rawlsian technique of shedding his 
particularity to reason as if he were in the original position. 
The question before us now is whether this shared conception of reason, removed 
from the context of tradition and history, is truly intelligible. Is it possible to exercise 
reason independently of awareness of context and place and time? Marx and Rawls both 
offer compelling reasons to distrust inherited consciousness and unchosen principles and 
ends. Yet, when given close attention, the idea of persons reasoning free of any tradition 
and choosing their own principles and ends is also seen to be problematic. 
At the heart of the problem is the task of making sense of the way these 
unencumbered selves might make choices. There are at least two reasons this is difficult. 
The first has to do with explaining how this individual might recognize and acknowledge 
reasons for action as such. That is, if the self exists prior to any ends it affirms, as Rawls 
says it does, then the initial choice of an end cannot itself be a strategic choice. In other 
words, the reason for choosing cannot be the recognition of a hypothetical imperative 
because for such an imperative to obtain implies some other end, the accomplishment of 
which this imperative advances. Neither can there be any unchosen obligations or 
designations of value making a claim on this individual. Duties and norms cannot carry 
the weight of reasons unless they are themselves freely chosen or accepted. For the 
Rawlsian, free individuals are “self-originating sources of valid claims.”198 Given what 
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Marx has to say about the “nightmare of tradition,” it seems this quote reflects Marx’s 
position as well. Being subject to a claim is compatible with freedom only when the 
claim is itself freely chosen.  
The second difficulty has to do with the way the noumenal self in the original 
position could identify activities and ends, not in the sense just mentioned, but in the 
sense of recognizing them for what they are. How, for example, could an individual, 
lacking all knowledge of his distinguishing features, properly recognize the celebration 
of the Eucharist, or a child’s first birthday party, or the writing of a dissertation, or a 
baseball game? None of these activities can be described as such without an awareness 
of context, tradition, and history that can only truly be gained through participation, in 
one form or another, in a particular way of life. All of these activities are practices that 
are constitutive parts of courses of life and ways of being, each of which are potential 
choices for the individual in the original position.  
This second difficulty is precisely that which must be confronted in the attempt 
to offer purely empirical historical observation. In Marx’s case the historian is not called 
to choose one of these ways of life, but he must still be able to identify and describe 
them properly and he must do so from outside of any particular tradition in order to 
recognize their connection to labor and the manner in which they are manifestations of 
false consciousness. These two difficulties are closely related; a close look at the first 
will make this relatedness apparent. 
For insight into the nature of this first difficulty, the work of Michael Sandel is 
instructive. In his work Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Sandel discusses Rawls’ 
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thought experiment and examines its implications.199 Whether or not they are truly fair 
to Rawls actual views, Sandel’s comments articulate succinctly the nature of the problem 
posed above and are thus applicable to that to which I have been referring as the 
“Rawlsian” account of reason in general.  He writes that on the Rawlsian view, “what is 
most essential to our personhood is not the ends we choose but our capacity to choose 
them.”200 If all contingent, particular features must be removed in order to provide for 
the expression of a person’s essential nature, and this nature is to be free and rational, it 
follows that what best expresses this nature is the act of choosing. The greater the 
potential for choice, the greater the freedom of the chooser. As Milton Fisk puts it, the 
nature of the Rawlsian free individual is to have “unrestricted antecedent choice.”201
For the Rawlsian, “the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it; even a 
dominant end must be chosen from among numerous possibilities.”202 Because the self 
is prior to any ends affirmed by it, its freedom is complete. This also entails that the 
self’s identity is fully distinct from that of others; any association with others that might 
provide the self with identity, such as a family or community, must also be the product 
of choice. Though the self may simply find himself with associations, they must 
ultimately be accepted freely in order for any ends or obligations following from this 
association to be binding. Sandel calls this the “priority of plurality over unity.”203  
Given that the essence of the individual person is the capacity to choose, and 
even dominant ends must be chosen, Sandel says, “it remains to be seen what exactly 
this choice consists in and how I come to make it.”204 He acknowledges that Rawls says 
that this choice “often rests on our self-knowledge,” but contends that this self-
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knowledge can really only be an awareness of wants and desires. “Such a ‘choice’ would 
involve less a voluntary act than a factual accounting of what these wants and desires 
really are.”205 This act of choosing is not voluntary because these wants and desires are 
simply given, not chosen. Rawls does not envision persons in the original position 
choosing specific, immediate ends, but because Marx’s free persons are not participating 
in a thought experiment, but actually living freely, Sandel’s criticisms of the 
intelligibility of such acts of choosing are relevant and applicable to Marx’s conception 
as well. Keeping in mind that the purpose of establishing a parallel between the accounts 
of reason in the work of Marx and Rawls is to allow us to bring objections to a Rawlsian 
view to bear on Marx’s, a further exposition of Sandel’s argument help to make clear my 
concerns about Marx’s position. 
According to the stipulations of the original position, the individual chooser has 
no knowledge of his status, affiliations, history, or conception of the good. Therefore, 
any wants and desires the individual has in this position must, if they are not themselves 
products of choice, be simply given. They must be dispositions or inclinations specific to 
the individual. If this is the case, Sandel says, the individual’s act of choosing an end 
“amounts to nothing more than an estimate or psychic inventory of the wants and 
preferences he already has, not a choice of the values he would profess or the aims he 
would pursue.”206 Thus, “deliberation about ends can only be an exercise in 
arbitrariness.”207 Whatever end is eventually chosen will be so chosen due to the given 
mental and physiological make-up of the individual. The choice, then, is either an 
expression of some particular characteristics that are not themselves part of the essence 
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of the person, or, if they are essential, they are part of the essence of an individual who is 
a species unto himself. For this reason Sandel concludes, “While the notion of 
constitutive attachments may at first seem an obstacle to agency- the self, now 
encumbered, is no longer strictly prior- some relative fixity of character appears essential 
to prevent the lapse into arbitrariness which the deontological self is unable to avoid.”208  
To understand how and why a Rawlsian would take this position on the priority 
of the self over the ends affirmed by it, we must examine Rawls’ reading of Kant. Rawls 
is a self-described Kantian and considers himself to be adopting and building upon 
Kant’s conception of autonomy.209  He writes, “Kant held, I believe, that a person is 
acting autonomously when the principles of his action are chosen by him as the most 
adequate possible expression of his nature as a free and equal rational being.”210 This is 
an accurate paraphrase of Kant. Yet, the interpretation of this position is flawed. We see 
a hint of his misreading of Kant when he says he cannot understand why for Kant the 
“scoundrel does not express in a bad life his characteristic and freely chosen selfhood in 
the same way that a saint expresses his characteristic and freely chosen selfhood in a 
good one.”211 That one would ask such a question shows that one is not working with 
the same conception of freedom as Kant. That one would describe the individual’s 
selfhood as “freely chosen” also suggests a mistaken understanding of Kant’s view of 
human nature.  
Rawls thinks that what is missing in Kant’s work is an “argument showing which 
principles, if any, free and equal rational persons would choose.”212 This shows that 
Rawls’ free chooser is, unlike Kant’s, free of any framework within which to choose, 
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unaided by the metaphysical moorings that in Kant’s philosophy prevent the individual 
from being swept along by the apparent determinism of the phenomenal world. 
Below I will show that Rawls’ reading of Kant is mistaken, or at least 
incomplete. Contrasting Kant’s conception of autonomy with Rawls’ shows that Rawls’ 
is ultimately empty. It will become clear that, as Allan Bloom has said, “a true Kantian 
interpretation of Rawls’ man in the ‘original position’ is that he is neither free nor 
rational.”213 The choices of an individual in the original position are not free but 
arbitrary; the Rawlsian individual is not an agent but a vessel. This will require a brief 
exposition of Kant’s philosophy, but this excursion is necessary. It is necessary in order 
to show that an account of reason operating independently of any particular tradition 
must offer some explanation of judgment, or, in other words, an explanation of how we 
name things. Such an explanation must necessarily make some metaphysical 
commitments of the sort both Marx and our Rawlsian would hope to avoid. An 
explanation of judgment is necessary not just for an account of freedom but also for the 
possibility of the sort of scientific observation that Marx attempts in his purely empirical 
recounting of history. 
Kant explains that judgment is necessary for experience, assumption of 
uniformity is necessary for judgment, and laws are necessary for the assumption of 
uniformity. As he writes in the Critique of Judgment, “We find in the grounds of the 
possibility of experience in the very first place something necessary, viz. the universal 
laws without which nature in general (as an object of sense) cannot be thought.”214 
Laws, such as the law of causation, are necessary for judgment, as are certain other 
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concepts that allow us to order the phenomena of experience. One has to understand this 
in order to understand why it is that for Kant a free will is one that is nonetheless law 
governed.  All actions, as objects of experience, must be understood as subject to some 
law. This is why autonomy for Kant cannot mean legislating a different law for oneself 
in different circumstances.  Free actions can only be judged as such if they are all 
understood as following, or issuing from, some cause.   
How is it, then, that freedom is considered at all possible in Kant’s view? It is 
Kant’s contention that appearances do not give us knowledge about things in themselves 
that allows him to posit freedom of the will. The “principle of the causal connection of 
appearances” is what allows for the possibility of experience. But all this does is allow 
us to make judgments about appearances. It does not allow us to make judgments about 
things in themselves.215 What we might call the external world is known only through 
the senses and therefore everything in the external world is considered to be subject to 
the principle of causation.  However, we know ourselves not only through our senses, 
but also through what Kant calls “apperception.” We are perceptible, or sensible, to 
ourselves but we are also intelligible. “In its intelligible character (though we can only 
have a general concept of that character) this same subject must be considered to be free 
from all influence of sensibility and from all determination from appearances.”216 The 
intelligible character of the subject is not sensible and can be understood independently 
of sensible causes and therefore can be considered free from the influence of sensible 
causes. The intelligible character has only to do with concepts, ideas and ideals.217   
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Marx and Rawls are both in concert with Kant in his attempt to render the 
individual self intelligible independently of any particular sensible context. Where the 
later two diverge from Kant is in their attempt to define the individual self independently 
of all concepts, ideas, and ideals, all except freedom and reason, that is.  
For Kant, a free action is one that is free from the causal influence of sensible 
objects or events, but not one that is uncaused. As Kant writes in the Grounding, 
“Everything in nature works according to laws. Only a rational being has the power to 
act according to his conception of laws, i.e., according to principles, and thereby he has a 
will.”218 An action free from the causal influence of sensible objects or events will still 
be subject to a law, but it will be the law of reason, otherwise known as the moral law.  
“Thus a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same.”219   
For Kant there is only one way to be free, only one way to be moral. A free 
action is one caused by a will acting in accordance with reason, that is, one that does not 
will contradictions or make false judgments. This is why Kant believes that the 
formulation of the Categorical Imperative in terms of willing a universal law is 
equivalent to the formulation in terms of treating persons as ends in themselves.  For it to 
be possible to will that a maxim become a universal law the maxim must be such that 
when universalized no contradictions ensue.  Treating persons as ends in themselves is a 
matter of making a proper judgment about persons, i.e. subsuming them under the proper 
concept. Treating persons as means only involves a false judgment about persons, which, 
if re-worded the right way could be expressed in the form of a contradictory maxim.220
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Autonomy truly is self-legislation for Kant. The moral self must follow a law, 
otherwise its actions would be unintelligible, but it cannot follow the law of causation of 
the sensible world because then it would not be free and it cannot follow a law imposed 
in some other way. This autonomy is self-legislation in the sense that the self adopts the 
law as binding for itself, yet the self does not create the law ex nihilo, as it seems it must 
in Rawls’ story. It must choose to follow the moral law, but if it does so it will follow the 
same law as all other rational moral beings.  What Kant’s metaphysical story provides, 
and which is lacking in the work of Marx, is an account of a potential object of choice, 
the moral law in this case, and categorically applicable reasons, neither of which are 
accidental or contingent upon custom or coercion. 
Rawls foregoes making appeals to a metaphysical framework because, he says,  
reasonable people will disagree about such frameworks and there is no way to establish 
such a framework by reasons and standards accepted by all. Marx rejects any 
metaphysical claims on the grounds that they necessarily result from alienated 
consciousness and cannot be discovered empirically. Both reasons are prima facie 
reasonable, yet because they both also reject reasons derived from inherited or received 
customs and standards as incompatible with freedom, neither has a way to explain free 
actions. 
It appears Sandel’s criticism of Rawls’ notion of freedom, when construed to 
apply generally, as really being an exercise in arbitrariness is apt. When Rawls wonders 
why the scoundrel does not express his freedom through his actions in the same way the 
saint does through his actions, the significance of the absence of any metaphysical story 
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becomes clear. Because Rawlsian freedom requires “unrestricted antecedent choice” and 
the free individual is a “self-originating source of valid claims,” a truly free act is one in 
which the agent gives value to the object of choice merely through the act of choosing 
rather than choosing according to this value. This means that any attempt to give reasons 
for a choice, or to understand how a choice was made, must necessarily result in an 
infinite regress. Ultimately, there can be no explanation for a free action. If the 
individual self is the original source of value it becomes unintelligible to speak of 
reasons why a particular value is chosen or attributed.221 The Rawlsian is subject to this 
criticism because of his failure to provide any explanation of judgment. This criticism is 
equally applicable to Marx. His description of the “realm of freedom” and the 
“development of human energy which is an end in itself” is subject to the same 
accusations of arbitrariness leveled against the Rawlsian view.222 His story about the 
freedom of the species-being and the lack of freedom of historically situated individuals, 
which is understood in contrast to the freedom of the species being, is now shown to be 
incomplete. 
To be charitable, one can imagine that a defender of the conceptions of reason 
and freedom found in Marx and Rawls might respond that the Kantian notion that 
actions following from basic desires and inclinations are not free is simply too strict. 
Certainly, this defender might say, holding Marx and Rawls to such strict standards does 
result in rendering free actions unintelligible. However, the Marxian and Rawlsian 
conception of freedom is one in which basic desires and inclinations, rather than being 
obstacles to freedom, are instead constituent qualities of the human nature to which 
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freedom is intended to give expression. After all, both Marx and Rawls consider the 
provision of certain staples, Rawls calls them primary goods, to be valuable to all 
persons regardless of specific interests and concerns. Perhaps it is fair to allow that there 
might be a range of potential objects of choice, or, for Marx, inspirations for creativity, 
which range is the same for all persons given the universal dispositions of human nature. 
Thus one might, it could be argued, make sense of reasons for ascribing value in these 
systems despite their rejection of tradition or metaphysics.  Maybe, just as saltiness and 
sweetness are universally appreciated qualities of food, and softness a universally 
appreciated quality of places to rest, desires for companionship or creative expressions 
of love, for example, are part of human nature and acting on such desires is not only 
compatible with acting freely, but is what gives freedom its high value. 
Such a response might be a plausible defense to the objections of arbitrariness 
and unintelligibility of freedom, though it must be admitted that drives and impulses are 
not the same things as reasons. Granting the initial plausibility of this defense, further 
examination reveals that this, too, is susceptible to a serious objection.  This objection 
was identified above as the second difficulty for Marx and our Rawlsian, namely, the 
difficulty of accounting for the ability to recognize given activities or practices for what 
they are. 
Ronald Dworkin explains that, “parties to the original position certainly have, 
and know that they have, an interest in general liberty, because general liberty will, pro 
tanto, improve their power to achieve any particular goals they later discover themselves 
to have.”223 What I will now argue is that individuals who are truly free in the Rawlsian 
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sense cannot discover themselves to have particular goals, only general goals. T. M. 
Scanlon defends the Rawlsian original position as providing “an Archimedean Point 
partly in virtue of the fact that this conception of a person is taken to be prior to any 
particular independently-determined conception of his good”(emphasis added).224 
Scanlon’s characterization of the person’s identity as being prior to any independently-
determined conception of the good highlights the reason that such a person can have no 
particular, or specific goals. This is because any particular, specific practice which might 
be a good for an individual will only be intelligible from within a particular context. This 
is true for several reasons that I will first list and then explain in detail below. All of 
these reasons have to do with the prohibition of any received conception of the good. 
 First, to be able to recognize any particular activity, such as marriage, for what it 
is requires membership in the community in which the activity is practiced and an 
identification of the individual with this community for participation in this activity to be 
a living option for the individual. Second, it is necessary to name properly one’s desires 
and passions before one can choose activities and practices that would satisfy these 
desires and passions. To do this one must be formed by the common stories and 
practices of a given community.  Third, participation in the sorts of practices constituent 
of a full life of the sort Rawls describes requires certain character traits, or virtues, that 
can only be developed by an individual who trusts a received conception of the good. 
This is true because these character traits require discipline and denial of natural 
appetites and desires. They cannot be known except by witnessing their embodiment and 
they cannot be chosen except on trust.  
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I choose marriage as a paradigmatic example of a particular good because of its 
central role in the philosophies of Vico and Marx and because it is such a common 
practice, frequently considered to be a part of a good life or at least a legitimate option in 
the quest for a good life.  
In order for something to be an object of rational choice, it must first be 
identified by the chooser. My contention is that it is only possible to recognize marriage 
as such from within a specific tradition. To identify two persons as being married one 
must understand them to be in certain relation to each other, having made a certain 
commitment with specific intentions, and relating to each other in a certain way. But 
more than this, one must also understand these persons to be living and acting within a 
specific community with specific norms. This is because marriage, while it is a 
relationship between two people, is also a public institution. There is no such thing as 
marriage simpliciter. There is only marriage as it is practiced and understood within 
certain communities. The couple, in deciding to wed, decides to engage in a practice 
already extant in and endorsed by the community and, though they make a promise to 
each other, they do so in a ceremony in front of the community or representatives of the 
community, thereby receiving sanction from the community.   
This sort of understanding and recognition of intention is only possible for 
someone within a tradition.  Just as one might observe a group of people running 
alongside a larger group of people yelling, while at the same time be unable to identify 
the scene as the 100-Meter dash at the Olympics without knowledge of context, one 
cannot observe the relationship between two people and describe it as marriage without 
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the requisite familiarity with context. Because intention cannot be observed, only 
inferred, familiarity with context and appropriateness is necessary for proper 
identification of intentional activities and practices. Unlike our ability to discover the 
properties of saltiness or sweetness in the foods we encounter, our recognition of 
specific practices as goods depends on abilities we cannot have prior to communal 
experience.  
In addition, in order to have the particular desire for marriage one must have the 
general desires which marriage might fulfill. For example, one must first have the 
general desires for companionship, love, and family, before one could decide on 
marriage as a way to satisfy this desire. Yet, being able to recognize these desires as 
such, that is, to name them as desires for companionship, love, and family, requires an 
awareness of, and sympathy with, the narratives of others.225 I have to see these desires 
felt and named in the stories of others with whom I can identify to be able to name them 
and plot a course for satisfying them. This sympathy, this fellow-feeling, depends upon 
imagination that comes with familiarity, and, more importantly, education. Neither this 
fellow feeling nor the faculty of imagination which makes it possible are necessary for 
one to be conscious of a desire for saltiness or sweetness.  
Furthermore, the recognition of certain desires as good and healthy and worth 
pursuing, and others as inappropriate and wrong to pursue or insignificant no matter 
their momentary strength, also depends upon an acceptance of the received wisdom and 
norms of the community. The choice to participate in a practice such as marriage is a 
choice to sacrifice certain desires for the sake of others. It is a choice to change one’s 
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identity and sense of self. One must have developed certain character traits, such as 
perseverance and selflessness, self-denial and integrity, to even be in a position to 
consider marriage a live option.  
The development of such character traits is possible only within a community 
and through acceptance of communal norms because by their very nature they result 
from stifling and denying other, more basic, desires and traits. The willingness to 
develop such traits follows from trust in commonality with others and in their wisdom. I 
have to believe that what has been good for another will be good for me because we are 
relevantly similar, and I have to trust that this will be so even though as in the case of the 
development of character traits necessary for marriage, it seems contrary to my own 
inclinations and basic desires. An individual in the original position is by definition 
unable to rely on this trust.  
Finally, the independent self would have no grounds for choosing between 
particular goods or of participating in them in a rational purposeful way because apart 
from a received tradition there would be no way of recognizing excellence or correctness 
in participation. Even allowing that this individual might have, and understand himself 
to have, a desire for a particular good such as marriage, because such a good requires 
participation, it is, in other words, a practice, the individual must have some criterion for 
directing his performance. He must have some standard of excellence. Once again, such 
a standard relies upon communal norms and established ends for a practice of which this 
individual must be, by stipulation, unfamiliar.  
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All of the foregoing is important for the overall problem my project seeks to 
address, which is to determine if it is possible to adjudicate between the two rival 
versions of historical inquiry of Vico and Marx. The reason the foregoing is important is 
because if the similarities that I suggest between Marx’s philosophy and the Rawlsian 
position hold true, then the criticisms just brought against the intelligibility of the 
conceptions of freedom and reason found in the thought experiment of the original 
position give some direction for an assessment of Marx’s science of history.  
C. Fred Alford declares that “Rawls’ concept of the self is actually remarkably 
substantial,” and says that Rawls’ description of the original position comes close to 
capturing the state of nature.226 I have argued in this chapter that such a conception of 
the self is not substantial enough for rational choice on the part of this self to be 
plausible or intelligible. Yet Alford’s claim that the original position represents the state 
of nature is useful in distilling the essence of the dilemma presented by Vico and Marx. 
As discussed in previous chapters, the foundation for the differences in the methods of 
historical inquiry for these two is what they make of the state of nature as an arena for 
historical observation. The reader will recall from previous chapters that for Vico the 
state of nature is opaque to the historian; for Marx it is transparent and provides the key 
to understanding all subsequent human behavior. It is in the state of nature that Marx 
finds the “real individuals” that are the premises with which historical inquiry begins and 
in the state of nature that the “first historical act” takes place setting history in motion. 
If Alford is accurate in his comparison of the Rawlsian original position with the 
conditions of choice in the state of nature, then the above critique calls into question the 
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conceivability of Marx’s foundational premises for historical inquiry, not to mention the 
plausibility of his vantage point that allows him to make his observations from outside 
any particular paradigm of consciousness. 
The next chapter will, through a discussion of the thought of Alasdair MacIntyre, 
among others, develop more fully the role of particularity and tradition in reason and 
observation.  
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CHAPTER VI 
A MACINTYREAN ANALYSIS 
In the previous chapter I argued that an important similarity obtains between the 
philosophies of Karl Marx and John Rawls. Both philosophers rely on a supposed ability 
to divest oneself of the limitations and lenses of particularity in order to reason freely. 
This similarity, I noted, might strike readers as odd given that it seems as if Marx would 
deny the very possibility of Rawls’ project due to the obstacle of ideology standing in 
the way of such reasoning. Yet, it was my contention that this similarity nonetheless 
holds because it is this same ability to escape the false paradigm of ideology that allows 
Marx to recognize the existence and nature of ideology and to understand the true forces 
at work in history. As Alasdair MacIntyre explains, a theorist of ideology such as Marx 
“is claiming that, in his own case at least, he can separate the ideologically contaminated 
element from the rest of his theorizing.”227 To be able to recognize that consciousness is 
false, one must be able to identify the truth. In other words, “to identify ideological 
distortion one must not be a victim of it oneself.”228  
MacIntyre’s insights serve to frame the question that the first part of this chapter 
seeks to address.  At issue is whether or not Marx can, as MacIntyre puts it, “separate the 
ideologically contaminated element from the rest of his theorizing.”  Above, in my 
discussion of Rawls’ original position, I tried to show that the concept of choice from 
behind the veil of ignorance is unintelligible. In this chapter I want to continue this line 
of argument and show that for the same two reasons that choices made in the original 
position are unintelligible, Marx’s “first premises” cannot function as the foundation for 
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his historical inquiry. His attempt to offer a purely empirical, non-ideological science of 
history must fail because the characterization of the behavior of pre-historic individuals 
is impossible. The first of these two reasons is that, given Marx’s description of the 
circumstances in which these individuals live, there is no way to account for intention on 
their part. This problem is the same as accounting for choice in Rawls’ original position. 
The second reason characterization of the behavior of these individuals must fail is that 
there is no way the unencumbered observer could recognize the movements of these 
individuals and render them intelligible as intentional actions.  
Selected arguments made by MacIntyre will serve as a springboard to help me 
begin to build my case, which will proceed to draw on the wisdom of a wide range of 
philosophers. I will then reconsider Giambattista Vico’s method of historical inquiry in 
light of these criticisms of Marx. 
In order to follow my argument, it will be important for the reader to recall the 
following points. First, Marx declares that his method “starts out from the real premises 
and does not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in any fantastic 
isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development 
under definite conditions”229(emphasis added). He says, “In direct contrast to German 
philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven.” 
This means that he begins with raw empirical observation of particulars and proceeds 
from there to build theory. Second, one circumstance of this process is the family, 
which, Marx explains, “from the very outset, enters into historical development.”230 The 
family is the “first social relationship,” having existed “since the dawn of history.” 
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Third, Marx defines “social” as involving the “co-operation of several individuals.”231 
Finally, consciousness is “from the beginning a social product;” it is the “direct efflux of 
their material behaviour.”232 Together these four points form the foundation for Marx’s 
historical inquiry. This purely empirical observation of individual men, before they form 
society and before consciousness arises, provides for Marx the key to understanding 
consciousness and ideology, and, therefore, human behavior. This foundation is what 
allows Marx to see past the illusion of speculation and philosophy and depict reality. 
These points are important to keep in mind for understanding my argument 
because what I hope to show is that, given point number four above, cooperation and 
formation of the family by pre-societal and pre-conscious individuals cannot properly be 
described as intentional or free actions. Just as significantly, the non-theory-laden 
observer would not have the necessary tools to be able to describe the behavior of 
individuals as the formation of a family or as cooperation. In other words, neither the 
formation of a family nor cooperation between individuals is the sort of event that can be 
recognized as such through pure empirical observation. The observations upon which 
Marx builds his theory of history are simply not possible. This does not mean that his 
insights regarding alienation and exploitation, and even false consciousness, to some 
degree, are without worth. It does mean, however, that his master key for understanding 
and interpreting history now lacks support. 
The philosophical seed-germs for both lines of my argument are found in the 
writings of David Hume. In the first instance, Hume criticizes the social contract theory 
of Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes famously had contended that men in the state of nature were 
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pre-social and came together to form society through a mutual agreement or contract. 
Hume’s objection is that the societal convention of promising, which is necessary for 
contract making, cannot itself arise with the contract because, as he says, “The 
observance of promises is itself one of the most considerable parts of justice, and we are 
surely not bound to keep our word because we have given our word to keep it.”233 
Language and conventions cannot first emerge from cooperation because they are 
necessary conditions for entering into cooperation. 
In the second instance, Hume’s argument that we cannot judge the morality of an 
action on the basis of observation alone shares with my argument the premise that the 
bare physical facts of an event do not provide sufficient information by themselves for 
moral judgment. Though, to use Hume’s example, Oedipus killed Laius and Nero killed 
Agrippina, we only call the latter event criminal because we ascribe certain intention and 
knowledge to Nero that we do not to Oedipus. As Hume explains, observation of an act 
of killing, for example, cannot provide the necessary criterion for naming the action 
murder because, “While we are ignorant whether a man were aggressor or not, how can 
we determine whether the person who killed him be criminal or innocent?”234
At the heart of these Humean arguments is the premise that in order to describe 
events as actions, mere empirical observation is not enough. MacIntyre develops this 
premise saying, “In order to identify an action as distinct from a bodily movement, the 
intention embodied in the action and the meaning the agent attaches to what he is doing 
must be understood.”235 It is not simply that, as Hume noted, we need to know about 
intention, among other things, to make moral judgments, rather, we need to know, or at 
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least have grounds for assuming, intention in order to name actions as such. This is 
because “the same overt behavior may be the expression of quite different beliefs, 
intentions, attitudes, and emotions.”236 The task of the observer in rendering this overt 
behavior intelligible as a given action is to determine the beliefs, intentions, attitudes, 
and emotions that are, or were, determinative. That is, the goal of the observer is not just 
to assign any one of a range of possible descriptions to an action, but to assign the one 
that as accurately as possible captures the agent’s own understanding of the action. 
Though the Marxist historian might insist that he can more accurately 
characterize an individual’s actions than can the agent himself given the agent’s 
embeddedness in the ideology of his time and place, such insistence is not available for 
application to Marx’s initial, foundational observations of the actions of pre-societal 
individuals. Ideology and false consciousness arise from the actions of these individuals; 
these actions are the key to understanding ideology and false consciousness and 
therefore cannot themselves be influenced by these distorting factors.  
Thus, to describe accurately and appropriately the actions of these first 
individuals as cooperation and the formation of families, these descriptions must not 
only be intelligible to the observer as such, they must also be determinative for these 
individuals. 
MacIntyre’s concern in making the above points is to show that in naming certain 
events as actions we are both assuming something about these events and engaging in a 
purposive practice ourselves. What we are assuming about these events is that they are 
directed toward some specific end rather than simply following from a certain cause. 
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The practice we are engaging in is rendering the action intelligible for ourselves so that 
we can name it properly and perhaps respond accordingly. As I hope to explain, this 
practice is different both in content and purpose than basic description. 
In arguing for this distinction MacIntyre responds to J.B. Schneewind who had 
written, “We may adequately explain some movements by saying (e.g.) that the person is 
dancing a jig and we can explain what a jig is without telling a story.” Schneewind was 
arguing, in effect, that it is possible to give basic descriptions of actions that are neither 
evaluative nor dependent on context for intelligibility. Yet, contrary to his intentions, his 
use of this example actually helps to make MacIntyre’s point that “rendering a particular 
sequence of actions intelligible always presupposes some degree of assumption about the 
narrative context of that sequence.”237 Though we (some of us anyhow) may be able to 
understand what sort of bodily motions a person means to describe in saying that so- 
and-so danced a jig, it is nevertheless not at all clear that this would always constitute an 
adequate explanation of these movements. This description may be help to paint a 
mental picture for someone, but this alone does not make it an adequate explanation of 
the action. Part of the reason for this is that in naming the event an action we ascribe 
intention to the actor.  
When MacIntyre writes, “Someone’s dancing a jig during a philosophical 
discussion, for example, is prima facie unintelligible,” it may seem as if he has just 
proved his opponent’s point for him. After all, we (some of us) may be able to picture 
exactly what this might look like and we might conclude, therefore, that if someone were 
to say, “Joe danced a jig in the seminar today,” he would have given an adequate 
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explanation of the day’s events. However, given that this sort of behavior is entirely 
inappropriate for a seminar, and no extenuating circumstances render it temporarily 
appropriate, and no one dances jigs in this community at any time anymore, naming the 
behavior as the dancing of a jig may be inaccurate however well it evokes the right 
image. Let me offer three examples to illustrate why this is so. 
It might be that Joe’s behavior was the unfortunate result of some sort of seizure 
that caused his body to convulse in a way resembling the dancing of a jig. In this case, as 
the behavior was involuntary, it is inaccurate, and inadequate, to ascribe intention to Joe 
by naming the behavior as the specific act of dancing a jig.  
Or, it might be that Joe had a strong dislike for the lecturer and decided to protest 
the lecture by disrupting the seminar with the most absurd behavior he could imagine. In 
this case, it would perhaps be accurate to describe Joe as dancing a jig, but it would still 
be inadequate. A more accurate, and intelligible, description of Joe’s behavior would be 
to say that he protested the speaker by disrupting the seminar with the dancing of a jig. 
Describing his behavior as the dancing of a jig would be accurate but only secondarily 
so. Instead, naming his action a protest would be a more accurate and intelligible 
description because the protesting was the determinative intention for the agent and 
protest is intelligible in such a context, however unusual it may be to do so by dancing a 
jig.  
Naming an action adequately requires both that the actor intended to so act, in 
other words, he understood himself to be performing this act, and so naming the action 
must render it intelligible to others. Thus, in a third example, it might again be the case 
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that, unbeknownst to all observers, Joe just decided to get up in seminar and dance a jig. 
It would, therefore, be accurate to name his action as the dancing of a jig. However, it 
would still be inadequate for an observer to so name his action because given its 
inappropriateness and the observer’s lack of relevant information, it remains 
unintelligible. A third party, upon hearing of this strange behavior, might be able to 
picture the scene if it were described as “Joe dancing a jig in seminar,” but this third 
party would not be able to understand this behavior. In fact, if his disruption were to 
remain unexplained, it might be the sort of thing that would lead us to describe Joe as 
insane and therefore refrain from considering his behavior as rightly called an action 
because of his lack of any intelligible intention.238  
As Wittgenstein has written, “a great deal of stage setting in language is 
presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense.”239 Given the inappropriateness 
of dancing a jig in a seminar setting, without more information than can be obtained 
through simple observation, naming this odd behavior as the dancing of a jig is 
premature and cannot accomplish the purpose of the practice of naming, which is to 
render intelligible the recipient of the name. 
Augustine makes a parallel argument in The Teacher, and his approach may help 
to illuminate the issue. In this section, Augustine is discussing words and signs and how 
we come to know things. He makes the point that “I do not know that any sound I may 
hear is a word until I know what it means. Knowledge of words is completed by 
knowledge of things, and by the hearing of words not even words are learned.”240 Words 
are signs for things and can be used to signify a thing. However, as Augustine notes, “If 
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I am given a sign and I do not know the thing of which it is a sign, it can teach me 
nothing.” So, at least two conditions are necessary for the use of a word to signify 
successfully. The hearer or reader of the word must know that the sound or scribble is a 
word, and he or she must already be conscious of the thing signified.  
Just as words signify, actions can communicate intentions. Naming an action 
properly is grasping the determinative intention signified by the action. Yet for a 
perceiver to grasp the intention signified by an action, he or she must recognize the 
action as such, that is, as intentional behavior, and he or she must be familiar with the 
particular intention that is signified. So, for example, in order to recognize an eye closing 
as a wink, I must perceive that this is intentional behavior, and not involuntary blinking, 
and I must be familiar with the practice of subtly communicating common recognition of 
some otherwise hidden fact, or of slyly communicating attraction.  
Augustine is only concerned with the signifying of objects, which can be 
perceived as such through simple observation, but following his reasoning can be 
instructive in thinking about the signifying of actions. Before I can understand “dog” to 
be a sign of something, I have to have first identified the object that is signified and at 
least given it a place-holder name such as “that thing.” I do not, however, have to have 
any special knowledge or experience to pick out a dog as a thing. But as the preceding 
example shows, recognizing an action as such requires more than simple observation.  
Picking out an action as such requires experience and knowledge of context. One 
fluid movement might encompass several distinct actions. For example, in one motion of 
my hand I might succeed in waving, smoothing my hair, and scratching my ear. If I am a 
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third-base coach in a baseball game all of these apparent actions might actually be 
described more accurately as putting on the hit-and-run. None of these actions can 
communicate intention to an observer unless the observer recognizes them as distinct 
actions and is able to place them in the context of normal practices. Naming is, then, a 
normative practice. The reader will recall that Vico argued that the ability to name 
follows from an appreciation for the concept of law, that is, from having the concept of 
regular, determinative behavior, either of things or persons. 
If this account of the practice of naming is accurate, it calls into question Marx’s 
attempt to find the key to seeing past ideology by means of a purely empirical 
examination of pre-social and pre-conscious individuals. Not only is there no way to 
account for the ability of these individuals to act intentionally given their own freedom 
from any context giving tradition, there is no way to account for the ability of the 
ideologically free historical observer (Marx) to recognize the actions of these individuals 
as such or to name them as cooperation or the formation of families. 
MacIntyre writes, “the social scientist will either accept what ordinary agents say 
about their actions or he will insist that he is able to characterize their actions in ways 
not available to them, and superior to them.”241 This captures to some degree the 
opposing approaches of Vico and Marx. I have argued against the plausibility of Marx’s 
foundational premises that provide Marx with his key to characterizing the actions of 
historical agents in ways (allegedly) superior to their own. Without his philosophical 
Rosetta stone, Marx has no grounds for claiming interpretive superiority.  
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If one accepts this conclusion there are three apparent remaining alternatives for 
the would-be historian or social scientist. The first is despair. I will address this option 
briefly below. The second apparent alternative is to supplement empirical observation 
with an appeal to some sort of metaphysical framework. I will show that such an 
approach is only apparently an alternative because it remains susceptible to the same 
criticisms to which Marx’s method succumbs. The final alternative is Vico’s, or at least 
something very much like it.  
Supplementing empirical observation with a metaphysical framework may, if one 
finds the framework plausible, be helpful in accounting for the naming of objects, but, 
unless the metaphysical framework includes a stipulation of hard determinism, will not 
aid in the recognizing and naming of actions. By “metaphysical framework” I have in 
mind something like Plato’s theory of the forms, Cartesian clear and distinct ideas, or 
Kant’s story of the necessary conditions and means of judgment.  
Though such metaphysical frameworks might purport to account for our ability 
to name objects by judging them to be instantiations of a certain universal, or concept, or 
form, they cannot provide a criteria for naming actions. This is because, as I have shown 
above, in order to name an action one must perceive or deduce the determinative 
intention, observation of overt behavior is not sufficient. Metaphysical frameworks help 
to account for judgment concerning objects of experience by providing an object of 
knowledge or a necessary structure of thought our awareness of which explains our 
ability to recognize and classify these objects of experience. Yet recognition of, or 
familiarity with, a particular form of overt behavior is insufficient for judging the 
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behavior to be a particular action because it is the agent’s intention that gives the action 
its name. The same overt behavior may properly be described as the performance of 
different actions in different circumstances just as the same action may be performed 
through different manners of overt behavior. 
Kant shows awareness of precisely this inefficacy of metaphysical frameworks 
for enabling the naming of actions in the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals.242 In 
this work Kant argues for a metaphysical foundation for defining good behavior and 
offers his famous categorical imperative in its various formulations. A morally good 
action, he says, is one motivated solely by duty. Though he argues with confidence that 
this is the case, he is less confident in our ability to recognize good actions as such. Even 
when, in our examination of our own actions, we can find no other motivation than duty, 
“there cannot with certainty be at all inferred from this that some secret impulse of self-
love, merely appearing as the idea of duty, was not the actual determining cause of the 
will.”243 I might be able to define what it means to be a morally good action with the aid 
of reason alone, but I cannot recognize a morally good action when I see one, or perform 
one myself, with the aid of reason alone because such a judgment requires me to 
perceive intention.244
Though it may not be so hard to identify our intentions when we do not purport 
to act in accordance with duty, the significance of this passage is to show that even Kant, 
who offered a justification for naming objects of perception, did not claim that his 
metaphysical framework could account for the naming of perceived behavior as specific 
actions. The ability to make these sorts of judgments comes only with experience; 
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persons do not possess this capacity for judgment of actions qua persons, but only as 
particular persons situated in particular times and places and, most importantly, context 
providing communities. 
Having dismissed the possibility of supplementing empirical observation with a 
metaphysical framework to provide for the naming of actions, we return to the remaining 
two options: despair or Viconian imagination.  
One might consider the obstacle of discerning the intentions of others to be 
insurmountable and despair of ever having confidence in one’s interpretation of others’ 
actions. This could take several forms. The first would be a radical skepticism, an 
acceptance of the impossibility of understanding others. Such a skepticism would mean 
more than just admission of fallibility. Without any standards or guidelines for even 
approximate interpretations, there would be no way to judge interpretations as probable, 
let alone certain. 
The second form this despair might take I call epistemological relativism. 
Because there is no set criteria for interpreting behavior, one might conclude, each 
person’s interpretation is true for them, or at least as good as anyone else’s. A less 
drastic variation of relativism would be what I call epistemological cultural relativism. 
On this view there is reasonable chance of success in interpreting the actions of others 
within one’s own culture, but no basis for confidence when interpreting the actions of 
those outside one’s culture.  
None of the above are truly live, practicable options. Neither radical skepticism 
nor epistemological relativism is feasible because to adopt either would be to give up all 
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hope of interacting successfully with others. MacIntyre is surely accurate when he 
writes, “If we did not constantly impute intentions, purposes, attitudes, and emotions to 
others, we should be at a loss to know how to frame our own. Agnosticism would 
paralyze us in many situations where we cannot refuse action.”245 Much of what we do 
is in reaction or response to the actions of others or intended to provoke a reaction or 
response from them. Without imputing intentions to others we would not know how to 
react and respond, nor would we know how to express our intentions and provoke 
responses. Epistemological relativism would be no more helpful than skepticism; if 
either were actually practiced, the choice of one’s means of expression would 
necessarily be arbitrary. 
Cultural epistemological relativism may initially appear more plausible, but 
because cultures are neither geographically discrete nor is cultural membership 
exclusive, and because cultural practices fluctuate and change over time, this apparent 
plausibility is chimerical. Such a position would rule out the possibility of learning from 
previous cultures or other current cultures and would certainly rule out the ability of 
members of various cultures to interact with each other.  
Each of these ways in which despair might manifest itself share the implicit 
conclusion that others, whether all others, or just others in different times and places, are 
dissimilar to us to such a degree that their behavior must remain unintelligible to us. 
Though this conclusion may seem to correspond to at least some of our experiences and 
may seem plausible, albeit unfortunate, if the foregoing arguments concerning the 
requisite conditions for choice and naming hold, it follows that we shall have to forfeit 
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any claim to finding our own actions intelligible if we despair at the possibility of 
naming the actions of others. 
We are able to characterize our own intentions and we choose the means of 
expressing our intentions according to the social contexts within which we find 
ourselves. If the actions of our contemporaries are unintelligible, then we will have no 
criteria for understanding or framing our intentions. We will have no basis for naming 
impulses, for choosing which impulses to indulge or curtail, and no model according to 
which we determine how to give expression to these impulses. Furthermore, the 
standards and practices of a society that provide a framework for naming and expressing 
intentions are necessarily historical. In other words, they necessarily are understood 
properly only when recognized as constituent parts of a larger story of a people. As 
MacIntyre explains, “Narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and 
essential genre for the characterization of human actions.”246
Despair is not practical and espousing it is disingenuous because interpreting 
actions and imputing intention is unavoidable. Yet, concluding that the alternative is 
unattractive is insufficient evidence that the actions of others, and ourselves, truly are 
intelligible. The basis for the method or means for rendering actions intelligible remains 
to be explained, just as it remains to be shown how this method of inquiry is to work. 
We must also establish standards for authoritative judgment. Such explanation and 
demonstration are found in the work of Vico. He offers an explanation of how this form 
of inquiry works and provides an account of how this skill and efficacy in its pursuit 
might be developed. 
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I return now to a second look at Vico’s science of history and an assessment of 
what it allows us to do and how it allows us to do it.  What his science allows us to do is 
precisely what MacIntyre argues a method of inquiry into human action must: it allows 
us to name actions by interpreting behavior and imputing intention. Secondly, his 
method allows for consistency. We are not forced, as observers, to exempt ourselves 
from generalizations and explanations we apply to others; we are not required to 
alternate between descriptions of persons as agents and objects; we do not have to 
consider historical inquiry, and the practice of social science in general, to involve a 
distinct type of knowledge, different from the knowledge we tacitly employ in day to 
day life. Finally, we are able to engage in ordered conventions of reliable, although 
admittedly not fool-proof, observation and inquiry that is dependent upon, rather than in 
conflict with, the premise that individual persons can and do act freely.  
What we find in Vico’s aptly named New Science is a way to study human 
societies and human behavior that allows us to maintain, to borrow a phrase from Rawls, 
reflective equilibrium. Rawls uses this description in an entirely different context but I 
borrow it for use now because it is appropriately evocative. Reflective equilibrium refers 
to a balance or relative equivalence between one’s intuitive conceptions and intentions 
prior to inquiry and the conclusions one reaches through the inquiry. In this specific 
context, when I say that Vico’s way allows us to maintain reflective equilibrium I mean 
that it does not present us with a picture of the world in which the very objects which we 
set out to study are absent. It does not lead us to deny in one setting those things that we 
know most certainly in another. 
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Clearly, inquiry should lead to greater knowledge than that with which one 
begins; it would be neither honest nor helpful if it ruled out a priori the possibility of 
discovering that one had been mistaken. Thus, I am not suggesting that reflective 
equilibrium require simple confirmation of received truths. What I am suggesting, 
however, is that if we begin an examination of past events or current practices in the 
hope of gaining a greater understanding of ourselves, our communities, and the 
communities of others, and the results of our examination are such that the persons and 
communities are unrecognizable to us because we find no individuals who are 
intelligible to us as such, this is a sign of a misstep. We study history, both ancient and 
recent, to understand our world; if our method presents us with a world in which persons 
are not free, in which behavior is not named according to intention, where the 
particularities of place and time and community are obstacles to understanding instead of 
keys to understanding, then our project has failed because we have not gained any 
insight into our world: we haven’t come to understand the world in which we actually 
live and think and act. We have, then, in effect described a different world and all that 
makes our lives intelligible to us and that provides our identity is simply denied in this 
other world; the name “I” is not intelligible in this other world. 
Michael Polanyi writes, “when we comprehend a particular set of items as part of 
a whole, the focus of our attention is shifted from hitherto uncomprehended particulars 
to the understanding of their joint meaning.” This is one way to describe our goal in 
studying history, that is, to grasp the connections between various individuals and 
groups and their influences on each other. However, Polanyi continues, “this shift of 
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attention does not make us lose sight of the particulars, since one can see a whole only 
by seeing its parts, but it changes altogether the manner in which we are aware of the 
particulars. We become aware of them now in terms of the whole on which we have 
fixed our attention.”247 This change in awareness can be instructive and helpful, but it 
can also lead us astray if, instead of changing the way we are aware of these particulars, 
by rendering these particulars intelligible, it renames them as beings other than those we 
set out to study. If, instead of illuminating the particulars with which we were concerned 
initially, our shift of attention causes these particulars to disappear, then the shift has not 
aided one’s project. 
Vico’s method maintains reflective equilibrium by starting with a close 
examination of how it is that we actually do make sense our own history. His inquiry 
begins with, and is motivated by, the basic assumptions that we can know ourselves and 
that other persons are similar enough to us to be understood by us. The faculty he 
employs and the procedure he follows for learning about others are the same as those 
employed and followed by individuals reconstructing their own pasts. He thereby avoids 
the potential for creating a new world of objects by treating each unit of observation as a 
subject. Importantly, this avoidance does not entail that the inquiry is restricted to 
particulars isolated in their particularity. Such a result would also fail the test of 
reflective equilibrium because of its failure to appreciate the assumption of commonality 
that motivates the inquiry. 
What allows Vico to navigate between these poles of error is his conception of 
freedom. Once again, Vico arrives at this conception of freedom through an appreciation 
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of his own freedom, not as he might abstractly imagine it to be, but by reconstructing 
how he actually has experienced it. He does not invent an unfamiliar type of freedom; he 
neither conceives of free behavior as indeterminate, as Marx seems to, nor as necessarily 
uniform, as does Kant. The self-knowledge upon which he draws in articulating this 
conception is recognizable and experienced in and for its particularity; the self that is 
known is not a stripped down, abstract Cartesian ego to which the name “I” has never 
truly been applied. 
The experience of freedom is the experience of choice, but it is not the 
experience of a bewildering obligation to create objects of choice and assign them value, 
nor is it the experience of being unencumbered by any particularity. The latter 
description is not even intelligible because experience is something that happens in time 
and place to some specific person: I can only have my experiences and I always exist in 
a given place at a given time. My experience of freedom is always my considering how I 
am to act in the circumstances in which I find myself. Colin Gunton articulates this truth 
about our experience, saying, “our human freedom is in large measure what we make of 
our particularity; it is what you and I do, or would do, as distinctly ourselves, and not as 
some one else.”248 This deliberation can only take place within the context of my life 
and the world that I am able to see. When MacIntyre writes, “I can only answer the 
question ‘What am I to do’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what stories am I a 
part,’ he makes explicit one of Vico’s fundamental insights.249 My knowledge of myself 
consists of an understanding of the stories of which I am a part. I can understand my 
own past actions by reconstructing my own thoughts, intentions, projects, and so forth 
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according to their place in my story and its connection with the stories of others. The fact 
that, as MacIntyre notes, in life “we enter upon a stage which we did not design and we 
find ourselves part of an action that was not of our making,” does not mean that we are 
not free. Instead it is what makes freedom so valuable and choice intelligible.250 
Hamlet’s soliloquy is only so powerful because of both the inescapable and nearly 
unbearable particularity of his place in a story he did not start and the freedom he must 
exercise as the co-author of this story. The significance of Vico’s insight is his 
recognition and designation of the faculty of the intellect that leads to the type of 
knowledge that we have of “what it must have been like to be Hamlet,” as the 
appropriate mean of historical inquiry. 
Vico’s method presents a third way, an alternative to the false dichotomy 
presented by Marx. As I have described above, Marx adamantly declared that his science 
would not proceed from the heavens downward, but from the ground up. The contrast he 
meant to draw was between his approach and science that begins with abstract reasoning 
about universals and continues by naming objects in the world according to these 
universals. The alternative, which he takes and seems to recognize as the only 
alternative, is to begin with pure empirical observation and form conceptions of 
universals according to perceived patterns and laws. I have presented arguments against 
the plausibility of the latter method, as well as explained how the former fails to 
appreciate sufficiently the significance of particularity. Thus, I want to emphasize that 
Vico does not accomplish this reflective equilibrium in his science by appealing to some 
vague concept of reason, a convenient deus ex machina. Instead, he identifies and 
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explains a hitherto unnamed, but not unused, faculty of the intellect, as well as the type 
of knowledge towards which this faculty is properly directed. 
According to Vico, fantasia is the faculty that is employed in rendering actions 
intelligible. The fruit of its exercise is not the equivalent of standard Enlightenment 
conceptions such as Descartes’ “clear and distinct ideas,” or Voltaire’s le bons sens, 
which are question begging in their simplicity and admit of no standards for authoritative 
judgment. Rather, the end it pursues is knowledge of “what it must have been like.” 
Fantasia is essential for human thought, but is not an ontological certainty, 
necessarily attached to the substance of humanity. Rather, it is something that humanity 
has gained through participation in community and is something that could be lost; it is 
also not something that allows for easy, obvious judgment. Possession of the faculty 
does not entail authority or expertise; fantasia admits of degrees. In fact, Vico suggests 
that this method of inquiry may be quite difficult and criticizes Descartes for seeking to 
“know everything in the shortest possible time and with the least possible effort.”251  
Vico named and explained a faculty of the intellect and a type of knowledge that 
had been universally used but not universally recognized. The faculty of fantasia is that 
which we use in remembering our own past, which is essential for understanding who 
and where we are in the present, and which in turn allows us to name our options and 
decide on action. It is the faculty upon which we rely in our interaction with others; it is 
essential for moral judgment.252
Critically, Vico’s contribution goes beyond the mere naming of this faculty. 
Merely naming this faculty would have left it ungrounded and subject to the same 
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objections that are so devastating to systems of inquiry that appeal simply to a faculty 
called “reason.” Specifically, such systems are confronted with questions about how to 
account for authority, for difference, for error, and about the nature of the objects of 
knowledge. Platonists have to explain the existence of the forms; Kantians have to 
explain the anthropological findings that challenge his claims of the necessity of certain 
categories of thought; enlightenment rationalists have to explain their own 
disagreements about the nature of reason and philosophers such as Voltaire have to 
explain why so many people just don’t seem to possess the ability to reason well and 
how one can tell the difference between those who do and those who do not.  
What enables him to avoid these types of objections is that Vico’s explanation of 
the faculty of fantasia depends upon his treatment of personhood as a way of being 
rather than a property a thing has. Understanding personhood, then, is also a way; it is a 
way of relating and interacting with persons that is itself an aspect of personhood. In 
contrast, it is Marx’s quest to identify empirically the property of personhood that leads 
him to make the same metaphysical mistakes for which he rightly criticizes others. This 
mistake results in the effort to isolate this property of personhood from its particular 
embodiment in an attempt to see personhood as it never actually is or could be. This 
effort in turn results in the neglect of all of the apparently accidental features of 
personhood that Vico correctly recognizes as necessary for understanding the behavior 
of any given person. 
Additionally, this understanding of personhood as a way of being, as opposed to 
a property, is what alleviates the formidable problem of establishing through 
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hypothetical empirical observation the basis for claims about the qualities of 
personhood. The inevitable question that arises in response to a theory such as Vico’s is 
that of how these practices began in the first place. Vico offers a story about the response 
of early humans to God’s commands. Yet, the plausibility of such a story is not critical 
for establishing the efficacy of the overall system of inquiry because the plausibility of 
the system is provided by actual personal experience and not by evidence about the 
origins of society. Whereas in Marx’s philosophy, the premises about the actions of the 
first individuals provide the key for understanding the subsequent behavior of persons 
and societies, in Vico’s philosophy, his speculation about the first individuals does not 
function as a necessary premise in his argument for his method.  
Because Vico recognizes personhood as a way of being rather than a property, he 
is able to recognize the dependence of fantasia on participation in specific ways of life, 
or practices. The three specific practices are marriage, burial, and religion. The 
significance of these practices, which Vico says are common and essential to all 
communities, is that they provide a system of ends and roles, thereby supplying a basis 
for naming, for normative judgment, and for identifying individuals according to their 
relations with others.253 Participation in these fundamental practices results in a common 
orientation that, despite the admittedly great differences in the particular ways these 
practices are performed, allows us to see the world that others see; it allows us to see 
both from where they see and with the same categories.  
Developing this ability to see as others do requires first an appreciation of 
difference, which is necessary for approaching one’s inquiry with the appropriate 
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caution and humility. It also calls for experience and wisdom; the greater the breadth of 
one’s own experience the greater the possibilities one can imagine and the greater 
vocabulary one will have for naming the projects of others. The desired end is what 
Isaiah Berlin describes as, “the exercise of judgment, a form of thinking dependent on 
wide experience, memory, imagination, on the sense of ‘reality,’ of what goes with what, 
which may need constant control by, but is not at all identical with, the capacity for 
logical reasoning and the construction of laws and scientific models.”254
The development of this ability is very much akin to the development of 
Aristotelian intellectual virtues. It is appropriate, then, that in approaching historical 
inquiry we follow Aristotle and “first agree that any discussion on matters of action 
cannot be more than an outline, and is bound to lack precision; for as we stated at the 
outset, one can demand of a discussion only what the subject matter permits, and there 
are no fixed data in matters concerning actions and questions of what is beneficial any 
more than there are in matters of health.”255 With this in mind, I will proceed in the next 
and final chapter to consider how an acceptance of Vico’s method might inform an 
approach to sorting through the data and arguments presented in the first chapter with 
the goal of growing in our understanding of such a momentous event as the ratification 
of the Sixteenth Amendment. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
After beginning this dissertation with a discussion of a concrete historical 
development of considerable import, namely the ratification of the Sixteenth amendment 
to the Constitution, and the circumstances surrounding this development, I proceeded to 
offer arguments that have been largely technical and theoretical. I want now to display 
some of the practical implications of these technical and theoretical arguments for the 
study of this historical event as well as for framing current public policy debates. I shall 
begin by returning briefly to the history of the Sixteenth Amendment and reframe the 
basic challenges before us in our attempt to understand how and why it came about as it 
did and then suggest some ways in which Vico’s approach illuminates this story. Finally, 
I will end by presenting an example to show how Vico’s approach to historical inquiry 
might actually be practiced. 
As discussed at length in the opening chapter, the story of the national income 
tax in the United States begins many years before the ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment. The process was a long one, involving many people, ideas and factors. 
Even a modicum of humility would lead a historian to deny any hope of providing a 
definitive, comprehensive explanation.  As Isaiah Berlin writes in The Hedgehog and the 
Fox, such an explanation is for us impossible 
because the number of causes upon which events turn is too great for 
human knowledge or calculation. We know too few facts and we select 
them at random and in accordance with our subjective inclinations…The 
more we know about the circumstances of an act, the farther away the act 
is from us in time, the more difficult it is to think away its consequences; 
the more solidly embedded a fact is in the actual world in which we live, 
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the less we can imagine how things might have turned out if something 
different had happened. For by now it seems inevitable: to think 
otherwise would upset too much of our world order.256
 
On first reflection, that an event such as the ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment would come to pass when and how it did seems almost necessary, as if it 
clearly follows from those selected factors that we know preceded it. Still, if we are 
honest, we know that there must be innumerable unknown events and circumstances and 
persons that were critical in the process, many of which might seem banal and which, if 
their significance were fully appreciated, might remove some of the luster from the event 
and some of the glory from those players we have identified as influential. Seemingly 
inconsequential events such as someone catching a cold, or a letter being lost in the mail 
may have had more to do with the way our story played out than some grand speech 
which we would like to think was of crucial importance. 
Pessimism is certainly warranted if we understand the task of the historian to be 
that of discovering the exact causes of not only the eventual occurrence of some great 
event, but the occurrence in the precise manner, place and time that it actually happened. 
If we want to know why the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified on the day it was, and 
exactly why each voter in each state voted the way he did, we shall search in vain and 
without end.  
But what if we are less ambitious and seek merely to identify the decisive factors 
that made the difference between the event happening and not happening? Though such 
an endeavor might not satisfy fully the curiosity of the professional historian, perhaps it 
would suffice to aid current political actors and observers by providing lessons 
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applicable to current and future policy initiatives. This sort of approach to history, 
seeking to discern parallels between the past and present that would inform decision 
making today is what Hegel calls “pragmatic history.”  He is dubious about the potential 
of even this less ambitious approach. He writes  
Rulers, Statesmen, Nations, are wont to be emphatically commended to 
the teaching which experience offers in history. But what experience and 
history teach is this—that peoples and governments never have learned 
anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it. Each 
period is involved in such peculiar circumstances, exhibits a condition of 
things so strictly idiosyncratic, that its conduct must be regulated by 
considerations connected with itself, and itself alone. Amid the pressure 
of great events, a general principle gives no help. It is useless to revert to 
similar circumstances in the Past. The Pallid shades of memory struggle 
in vain with this life and freedom of the Present. Looked at in this light, 
nothing can be shallower than the oft-repeated appeal to Greek and 
Roman examples during the French Revolution. Nothing is more diverse 
than the genius of those nations and that of our times (emphasis 
added).257
 
If each period truly is involved in circumstances peculiar to the time and if 
conditions of things are so idiosyncratic as Hegel claims, then perhaps it is a fool’s 
errand to look for lessons in history. Searching for a general principle to follow and 
apply must be a wasted effort if Hegel’s description of the difference between periods is 
accurate. Even if we could discern a principle from study of the past, it would be 
principle only applicable to the unique situation from which it was drawn. 
I want to suggest, however, that the study of history is not in vain, and that a 
pragmatic approach to history is worthwhile and can be fruitful. Although we may not be 
able to find a general principle to follow when trying to reproduce events of a certain 
kind, there may be other important things we can learn from history to help us today. 
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Applying lessons we find in the work of Vico can help us salvage such a project, though 
to appreciate how this might be we will have to change the questions we ask as well as 
the method we follow in pursuit of answers to these questions. In what follows I offer a 
sketch of the nature of, and means for, study of the Sixteenth Amendment, informed by 
my understanding of what Vico has to teach us. 
A critical point to make in this sketch is that our object of study should shift from 
the event of ratification itself, to the people surrounding the event. We should remember 
that the type of knowledge we are to seek in historical inquiry is not precise knowledge 
of cause and effect, but understanding, specifically understanding of “what it must have 
been like” for the people we are studying. Rather than viewing the ratification of the 
Sixteenth Amendment as a discrete event whose exact causes we hope to uncover, it may 
be more useful to see it as a sign of a change in the attitudes and thought of the 
American people. Ratification of an amendment to the Constitution is a vote of approval 
of change.  Our project, then, will be to come to understand the change as they saw it, to 
understand why they made the change, and how the change affected these people in the 
years following. We will want to know the changes that made such an amendment 
possible, and why they happened, not necessarily the precise factors that led to its 
ratification on February 13, 1913.  
Our first step, and part of avoiding the pitfalls of which Berlin warns, is to see 
the ways in which our object of study was not inevitable, not to be expected, and 
somewhat peculiar. For example, income taxes had been levied in other countries at 
other times, but never before in a democracy. It might be unremarkable that a dictator 
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would impose a tax on the incomes of his people; but it is a different matter for people to 
impose such a tax on themselves. We should also ask how it is that something that was 
apparently unthinkable, and evidently unthought, at the time of the country’s founding, 
and which gained little popular traction the first few times it was proposed, came to be 
something that was accepted and desired by most of the country. When Secretary Dallas 
suggested a national income tax in 1815 the response was silence. Less than a century 
later Congress approved an amendment to the Constitution and over 80% of the states 
supported this change that would allow for a federal income tax. 
What changed in the way people thought about themselves and their government 
that made them first consider and then approve taxation according to one’s ability to pay 
rather than according to one’s purchases or behavior? As both Buenker and Weisman tell 
us, an important factor influencing the acceptance of this tax was the newly popular view 
that fairness in taxation did not demand precisely equal contribution of dollars but 
contribution of an equal share of one’s income. In fact, prominent advocates of this 
amendment such as William Jennings Bryan and Theodore Roosevelt appealed to the 
fairness of the income tax and their overall concern for social justice, which itself was a 
relatively new concept. Thus, understanding the ultimate change in the method of 
taxation will entail explaining the shift in the use and understanding of words like 
“fairness” and “justice” that made previously unsuccessful arguments into convincing, 
persuasive cases for change.   
A further observation that seems readily apparent, yet is not so easily explained, 
is that there seems to have been a change in the general population’s sense that a federal 
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income tax was in their best interest, in addition to its being the fair way to raise money. 
It is not hard to see why the average, non-wealthy person would find the income tax 
financially preferable to the tariff system; the income tax would be much easier on the 
pocketbooks of the working class. This fact about the tax was not new, however, and 
therefore cannot alone explain their change in attitude. A federal income tax would give 
greater power to the government in Washington. Though one can understand why the 
lawmakers and executives in Washington might favor the tax for this reason, it is not 
immediately clear why the people in the state legislatures would determine that this tax 
was in their interests as well when for so long they had felt differently.  
One factor that we know did change in the years immediately prior to the 
ratification of the Sixteenth amendment was the federal government’s per capita 
spending. This spending increased sharply as the nation’s population did the same. That 
this was a factor is intuitive, but the way in which it was a factor is less certain. An 
equally conceivable response to the increases in spending would have been a demand to 
cut back rather than a call for new taxes. It seems as if a change in the way people 
viewed the role of government in their lives had something to do with their acceptance 
of the government’s greater spending and corresponding need for revenue. 
If we can come to understand the changes in the way people thought about 
fairness, self-interest, and government we might begin to understand those factors that 
made the Sixteenth amendment possible. What we discover might also guide us in our 
look at how the income tax affected the populace. If, for instance, we find that changes 
in the three fundamental institutions led to changes in the way people thought, this will 
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direct us to examine how the result of these changes, namely the ratification of the 
Sixteenth amendment, in turn affected these institutions, with one possible outcome 
being a better understanding of other events and changes in the past century. 
Having framed our project of understanding the ratification of the Sixteenth 
amendment as, fundamentally, an attempt to understand why people changed their minds 
about certain basic concepts, a quick look at alternative approaches to this attempt will 
illustrate the attractiveness of Vico’s method. One of our choices for explaining these 
changes in thinking is that the people’s ability to reason changed: for better or worse, 
their ability to reason using the basic concepts of fairness, self-interest, and government, 
changed. Perhaps they came to recognize the true meanings of the concepts of fairness 
and self-interest and finally understood the correct role of government. Or, perhaps their 
previous understanding was more accurate and they forgot what they had known. Maybe 
the true meanings of these concepts, previously obscured in one fashion, came to be 
obscured differently because of changes in the modes of production. On any of these 
accounts, one proposing such a story would have to provide some explanation for the 
independent ontological status of these concepts as well as claim some privileged 
understanding of these concepts unavailable to those persons who are the objects of our 
study. Difficulties with and objections to these sorts of positions have been detailed in 
previous chapters. 
Vico’s method has in its favor fewer ontological commitments and more humble 
estimations of the observer’s intellectual prowess and perspective.  This method seeks 
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explanations for changes in ways of thinking by examining changes in the contexts and 
settings in which the concepts in question were used and understood. 
The faculty we must employ in our application of Vico’s method is imagination; 
we must try to see the world as our subjects saw it. We must search for those factors that 
altered their vision and with it their thought about fairness, taxation, and the role of 
government, among other things. 
The key to exercising our imagination, that condition which provides a window 
into the minds and lives of the people we are studying, is our participation in the three 
fundamental institutions of human society. The fact that we share with the citizens of the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries a similar framework of consciousness and moral 
orientation shaped by our participation in the institutions of marriage, burial, and 
religion allows us a starting point for understanding the world as they experienced it. 
This also gives us some guidance in our search for understanding differences between 
their vision and ours insofar as it directs us to look into changes in the practices 
constitutive of these institutions as bellwethers for changes in ways of thinking.  
What I must make clear at this stage is that this call for using our imagination is 
not a suggestion that historians retire to the armchair to daydream or speculate about the 
Sixteenth amendment. History is unquestionably an empirical endeavor. The role of the 
imagination is to guide empirical investigation and to inform our understanding of the 
significance of empirical findings.   
I suspect that many of the items identified by historians as significant factors in 
the ratification of the Sixteenth amendment have been identified accurately. Where I 
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think Vico’s insights can help is in our ability to grasp the ways in which these factors 
were influential. When scientists came to understand the process of photosynthesis, their 
discovery was not that sunlight was a factor in the growth of plants. That plants need 
sunlight had been known for ages; what was new about the discovery of photosynthesis 
was the appreciation for the way in which sunlight helped plants grow. I propose that 
what we can learn from Vico about studying history is analogous to what scientists 
learned about plants in their discovery of photosynthesis. It is likely that historians have 
been exactly right in identifying industrialization, economic developments, and 
population shifts, among other things, as major factors leading to the eventual 
acceptance of the federal income tax. The contribution I hope to make with this 
dissertation is to describe a way of understanding the connections between such factors 
and the thoughts and reasons that move people to choose and act.  
Once we recognize and appreciate the relationship between reason and practice, 
and we grasp the significance of the role of our participation in basic human institutions 
such as the family in shaping our thoughts and concepts, we can begin to see the manner 
in which those factors that our intuition identifies as significant actually influence 
change. Rather than being forced to choose between an assumption of determinism and 
study of material conditions on the one hand and a commitment to human agency and 
the study of reasons on the other, the arguments I have made in the preceding chapters 
provide the basis for a method of historical inquiry that traces the development of 
reasons to changes in the structure and practices of fundamental human institutions. 
Because we too are shaped and formed by our participation in these institutions, we can, 
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through the exercise of the faculty of imagination, understand how factors such as 
urbanization, for example, might affect the family structure and its practices. With some 
effort we can also imagine how changes in family structure and practices might, in turn, 
change the nature of relationships and familial roles that inform people’s concepts of 
duty, obligation, fairness, responsibility, and self-interest, for example. The insights we 
gain through such inquiry may not always, or ever, supply neat explanations for the 
events we study; we cannot hope our conclusions will rise to the level of certainty 
attained in some other fields. Still, as we develop our method and improve our 
imagination, perhaps our capacity to devise effective policy, influence change, and 
anticipate the consequences of particular policies will also improve. 
Improving our ability to anticipate the consequences of policy may be the most 
valuable result of adopting this approach to historical inquiry. Directing our attention to 
changes in the practices of the basic institutions in search of an explanation for political 
or moral change may condition us to consider the influence of potential policies on these 
same institutions, thereby giving us a key for anticipating unintended consequences of 
said policies. 
As I conclude this dissertation I want to present the reader with an example of 
how the principles of historical inquiry I have advanced might look in actual practice. In 
what follows I will summarize some findings detailed in a demographic report titled 
Theory of Fertility Decline by John C. Caldwell.258 I have two purposes for highlighting 
this particular study. The first is that it demonstrates how changes in policy can bring 
about changes in family practices and family roles thereby changing people’s 
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understanding of self-interest, the family, and the government. The second purpose is to 
suggest a possible connection the types of changes described in this study and the 
changes in American society that set the stage for the ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment. 
Caldwell’s book is long and full of empirical data and sophisticated arguments; I 
cannot do justice to his entire thesis in my space here. However, I do think that even a 
brief exposition of some of his main points will help to explain the practical import of 
this dissertation.  
Caldwell’s topic is fertility decline; specifically he is interested in explaining the 
regular occurrence of falling birth rates in societies as they become modernized. “The 
mainstream arguments,” explaining declining fertility arguments, he says, “are that 
fertility is high in poor, traditional societies because of high mortality, the lack of 
opportunities for individual advancement, and the economic value of children.” There 
are some reasons to question these arguments, though. Of these, “the most fundamental 
issue is whether the theory actually deals with reactions and accommodations to material 
circumstances. There is a persistent strain in demographic transition theory writings that 
claims that rationality comes only with industrial, urban society.”259 Caldwell quotes the 
United Nations Population Studies to support his characterization, “‘ The entire process 
of economic and social development… itself changes people’s outlooks from traditions 
and fatalism towards modern concepts and rationalism.’ ”260 This approach is 
inadequate, he thinks, and he attempts to show why. 
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Caldwell identifies one of the sources for this mistaken approach as a failure to 
appreciate the rationality of the community prior to the change that these theorists are 
seeking to explain. A criticism he repeats throughout the book is that too often these 
observers have studied only the change itself and the resulting conditions and not the 
conditions prior to the change. The result is a failure to appreciate that certain concepts 
form and new options emerge as objects for consideration only after certain other 
changes happen. Let me give an example.  Discussing popular theories about the 
transition from family-based communities to the emergence of a State, Caldwell says, “It 
sounds as if an interest within the traditional family in national and international affairs 
produces a new economy and new state apparatus… rather than a non-familial economy 
bringing employees out into a world where these matters are now important to them.”261  
Because they do not take the time to understand the communities prior to their 
modernization, such theorists are not able to perceive that those ends which seem 
rational after modernization are often not even intelligible to members of these 
communities prior to certain changes in practices and institutions. It is mistaken to 
attribute changes in fertility rates to newly improved reasoning capabilities; instead 
changes in fertility rates are signs of changes in perceived options and ends. Another 
way of stating this claim is Caldwell’s observation that “If much of the behaviour and 
attitudes measured are merely what the actors do or say in a specific economic context, 
then the social change scales are meaningless except as evidence of that context.”262 In 
other words, presentation of such data leaves unanswered the question of why the 
context changed. 
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I hope that the reader will begin to see now why I have chosen Caldwell’s book 
to illustrate the practical implications of my more theoretical argument. His insight is to 
look for data to identify the nature of, and the explanation for, the change of context that 
takes place in modernizing cultures that leads its members to identify as rational 
behavior that would previously been irrational. 
The specific factor Caldwell identifies is mass formal education. “The primary 
determinant of the timing of the onset of the fertility transition is the effect of mass 
education on the family economy.”263  It is not that through education previously 
ignorant people come to understand birth control and the rationality of reducing birth 
rates. Literacy, for example, is not the issue. Instead, “The greatest impact of education 
is not direct but through the restructuring of family relationships and, hence, family 
economies and the direction of net wealth flow.”264 Participation in mass education 
changes the family in such a profound way that “the first generation of mass schooling 
appears to be enough to initiate fertility decline.”265
Evidence shows that the relevant change is not that children become more 
expensive with the onset of mass education, though they do to some extent. Nor is it the 
case that through education parents are made aware of just how expensive children are. 
The important factor is the direction of something called “net wealth flow.” In very basic 
terms, fertility declines as mass education increases because the wealth that parents 
invest in their children no longer comes back to them, or to their extended families in the 
same way as before. 
 
 159
High fertility rates persist in communities where there is a strong family 
morality, where the family unit, including what we would identify as the extended 
family, is in many ways self-sufficient. In these families children work and contribute to 
the family economy. Members of these families are dependent upon each other for all 
manners of support. Identity is tied very closely to family membership and such 
concepts as duty and obligation and justice are shaped accordingly. In such families the 
costs of raising children are offset by the expectation that children not only contribute to 
the family while they are children but, when they are older, they will care for their 
parents and grandparents. In communities where modernization takes place but without 
mass schooling, fertility rates do not decline. 
 Mass education changes this because, “Schools destroy the corporate identity of 
the family.”266 They do this by teaching students to understand themselves as citizens, 
broadening their horizons beyond those of the family, and leading them to see the 
“immorality of putting family interests first.”267 This sounds like a pejorative 
description, but I do not think Caldwell intends it this way. Instead, the goal is to relate 
the change in family relations that takes place when, “it becomes clear that the society 
regards the child as a future rather than a present producer, and that it expects the family 
to protect the society’s investment in the child for that future.”268 The family and the 
child now become dependent upon the society and the society is dependent upon the 
child. Thus, it is not necessarily that the state seeks to deceive children about moral truth 
or undermine traditional morality. Rather, the communal understanding of moral terms 
such as “obligation” change as the practices that provide the context for such terms 
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change. Once these changes take place, the net wealth flow is no longer positive for 
parents raising children and having fewer children becomes a rational thing to do. 
I am afraid that I cannot do justice to the full persuasive force of Caldwell’s data 
and arguments in this context. I hope that I have at least provided a glimpse of how 
empirical historical research might be guided by, and through success lend support for, 
my conclusions about historical changes following from changes in the ways people 
think which are themselves generated by changes in fundamental human institutions. 
These changes in the fundamental institutions may be brought about unintentionally and 
by factors that are prima facie innocuous. 
Above I noted that I had two reasons for discussing Caldwell’s book. I have just 
explained the first; the second reason is that the very changes he details in his study may 
have some explanatory value in the quest to understand the Sixteenth amendment. I have 
already characterized this quest as, in very general terms, an attempt to understand why 
people changed their minds about the fairness of an income tax and the desirability of 
giving more power to the federal government. The types of changes that follow from 
mass schooling are the types of changes that I have suggested might explain the increase 
in popularity of the federal income tax that led to its eventual enactment. 
Caldwell explains that with universal schooling, the traditional family morality is 
supplanted by a “new, community morality.”269  Societies with strong family structures 
and family-based morality “could be stable without central governments; indeed the 
demands of governments posed some threat to the familial-based morality that justified 
the family structure.”  As the family-based morality is weakened, a stronger central 270
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government is necessary to maintain order. This moral system is affected by mass 
schooling because “it becomes clear that the society regards the child as a future rather 
than a present producer, and that it expects the family to protect the society’s investment 
in the child for that future.”271 The society is dependent now on the child and the family, 
but in different ways. Also, because the child is expected to be in school, and not 
contributing to the economy of the household, the child’s sense of responsibility to the 
family is diminished. This ultimately leads to lower fertility rates because children 
provide fewer returns to the family; it also leads families to be less self-sufficient and 
more prone to develop some dependency on the government.  
What we see, then, with the onset of mass education is changes in the way 
individuals understand their own identity, changes in the way people understand their 
responsibility to their family and to their society, and in the way they view their 
society’s responsibility to them. It brings about a need and an expectation of a stronger 
central government. These changes are among the changes that set the stage for the 
ratification of the Sixteenth amendment. Interestingly, the proportion of students 
attending school daily in the U.S. was 35% in 1870, 41% in 1890, and 53% in 1910, a 
steady increase on its way to 68% in 1930.272 1909 was the year the amendment passed 
Congress, 1913 was the year it was ratified. If Caldwell’s thesis is on the mark, it could 
very well be that changes in education policy were indirectly responsible, along with 
other factors to be sure, for the eventual acceptance of the federal income tax.  
As I wrote above, we should not expect Vico’s method to provide us with neat 
explanations for political events. Even if my hypothesis about the relationship between 
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changes in education policy and the ratification of the Sixteenth amendment is accurate, 
the relationship certainly is not a causal one, nor is it the only important factor we might 
hope to discover. Certainly more research would need to be done to confirm my 
hypothesis, but if such confirmation were achieved, this would be a significant step 
towards a new way to study history, particularly political history. It would also give us 
good reason to examine common institutional structures and practices of various groups 
in the hope of understanding why they take the stances they do on certain issues. It might 
also help us to anticipate the way policies might affect society by guiding us to think 
about how they would affect institutions such as marriage.  
A final point: today our society faces many questions about the nature and status 
of the three fundamental institutions Vico identifies. We have already seen great changes 
in the institution of marriage, with no-fault divorce, higher divorce rates, childless 
marriage, and marriageless parenting, and we are debating expanding the definition of 
marriage to include same-sex couples. We are not currently debating burial per se, but 
we do face many questions about end of life care and the responsibility of families and 
government for the elderly and infirm. We also face questions about the nature of 
religion and the appropriateness of various types of religious practice. I would propose 
that as we struggle with these changes and questions we not only consider such 
important concepts as justice and liberty, but we also consider how changes in these 
institutions might affect these concepts and others as well as how these changes might 
affect our ability to understand our past and other cultures. We can expect that the 
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further our practices are from those of past and peer cultures, the greater the imaginative 
effort that will be required to engage them. 
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